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Introduction
In the last 20 years we have witnessed the rise of populism, a phenomenon with a fluid defini-
tion. From the end of the 1990s to the present day, this political ideology has been capable of
an incredible transformation, from a phenomenon reserved for members of the most extreme
fringes of the political spectrum to a tsunami capable of increasing its political support and ob-
taining relevant positions in the governments of 11 countries of the European Union. In recent
years the attention on the phenomenon by politics, journalism and the scientific community has
been very high. Despite this, its definition is still smoky because populism ramifies over and
over making life difficult for those who pursue the goal of labelling it. Its chameleonic nature,
however, derives from its survival instinct, in fact one of the common traits among the various
populist parties is to try to "always be on the piece", keeping up with the hot topics of the mo-
ment regardless of their nature.
In the first chapter the focus is on literature about Populism. A common definition for populism
and its ramifications is first sought. We then proceed with the analysis of the two main currents
of thought on this phenomenon, one that exalts its usefulness by describing it "as a process
regenerating democracy, which, by cleaning it of all its waste, recovers its true principles and
values." while the other defines populism "as a real threat to democracy: the calling to forms of
direct democracy would imply the downsizing of constitutional guarantees, the very bulwark of
democratic systems".
This will then open the debate on Euro-sceptic ism and the extreme right, which are very often
linked to populist parties. And finally, a review of some important works on populism con-
ducted in Europe, mainly from an empirical point of view.
The second chapter will present the dataset used for the analysis. In the first section we will
explore the dataset and the most interesting variables contained in it. In the second section we
will explain how the independent variables used in the various models have been constructed
and how the pre-existing variables in the starting dataset have been recoded in order to make
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their effect more easily interpretable.
In the third chapter the models used in this study are discussed and socio-economic explana-
tions are sought from the analyses. This chapter is subdivided into three subsections each for the
categories of parties of interest (populist and/or extreme right-wing and/or Eurosceptic parties).
For each subsection we have regressed 4 different dependent variables. One for the feeling of
closeness to a party, one for the vote declared in the previous elections while the two remaining
explained variables are indexes for the closeness to the ideology for the party of that section,
constructed through the use of attitudinal variables.




Populism is a complex phenomenon, to which sociologists, political scientists and economists
have never managed to give a definitive connotation, further considering the heterogeneity of
the individual developing contexts particularly in the last twenty years.
Numerous scholars over the past few decades have emphasized that populism is a phe-
nomenon and a concept that is difficult to define. In his book “Populism 2.0" Revelli underlines
how populism runs the risk of becoming a catch-all word:
“a word that has caught all old and new things, as if they belonged to the same nature, rad-
ical protests from the day before yesterday and forms of electoral revolts today and perhaps
tomorrow, the nineteenth-century Russian populists and the Italian apolitical [. . . ] Everything
is outside and (but not always) against the so-called establishment" (Revelli, 2017)[27].
In 1963 Isaiah Berlin compared the search for a definition of the concept of populism “to
the attempt of many bridesmaids to wear Cinderella’s shoe" (Pinelli, 2010)[25]: a vain search
for reconciliation between the theoretical model and the changing heterogeneity of the subjects
examined.
In a short 2010 essay entitled “Populismo, una definizione indefinita per eccesso di definizioni",
Ilvo Diamanti notes that the term is used mainly in a critical sense, to indicate “a system, or a
political subject, not very liberal and tendentially authoritarian" (Diamanti, 2010)[5]; in this
work Diamanti lists some of the possible, or at least real, uses of the concept under examination.
He notes how the word populism is commonly used to indicate:
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“a wide range of political actors from the European extreme right. Shared by a xenophobic
and, at the same time, anti-globalist, as well as anti-European [. . . ] speech. Others also refer
the League to this type of political entity [. . . ]; there is also talk of populism to define not only
parties or movements, but leaders. In general, the leaders who have invested heavily in direct
dialogue with the citizens are populists" (Diamanti, 2010)[5].
Of a similar opinion, Nadia Urbinati claims that “populism is today one of the most used and
least meaningful words because it is too full of contrasting signifiers" in the preface of the Ital-
ian version of What is populism? (Müller, 2017)[24].
In her book “What is populism?" Jan-Werner Muller highlights how “every time we talk about
populism [. . . ] it is far from obvious to know what we are talking about". One of the causes,
probably the main one, of the indeterminacy of populism, of its “indefinite-definition", is to be
found in the very definition of “the people".
In the attempt of a global understanding of the phenomenon it becomes essential to start
from its etymological root, the population; the latter is an imagined community, it is a construc-
tion open to a plurality of definitions. I therefore believe it is impossible to identify a common
denominator for all the cases of populism mentioned in the literature or to find a single essence
behind all the consolidated uses of the term. For this reason, I think it is more useful to try to
divide populism into various subsets.
1.1 Populist families
The term was used for the first time in Russia, narodnic̆estvo, by a political and cultural move-
ment of the late nineteenth century which aimed to redeem the dignity of rural communities.
Initially, populism represented an ideological and political position whose main depository of
positive moral and cultural values was the population, in opposition to particularistic institu-
tions and powers. In analogy to what was happening in Russia, in 1891, the People’s Party was
founded in Cincinnati(U.S.A.). This group, consisting of an aggregation of farmers, opposed
the overwhelming power of the banking system and great finance which undermined the inter-
ests of the category. The People’s Party, formally disappeared in 1912, turned into a purely
xenophobic and nationalist movement in the following years (Taguieff, 2003)[38].
Starting from this brief historical reference, it is interesting to explore M. Canovan’s vision:
we can divide populism into two large families:
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• agricultural populism (which includes “the original populisms", the Russian and Ameri-
can ones mentioned above);
• political populism (linked “to direct democracy devices [. . . ] , to the mobilizations of
mass passions, to the idealizations of the man on the street") (Canovan, 1981)[3].
“From these two macro-categories Canovan derives all possible meanings of the phenomenon
under study: thus from the agrarian one derives the radicalism of the peasants (well represented
by the People’s Party), the movements of the farmers (typical form of the populisms of Europe of
east of the nineteenth century) and agricultural intellectual socialism (such as the movement of
the Russian populists), while “populist dictatorship (it is the case of Peron) would descend from
political populism"; populist democracy (in which referendums such as Switzerland are widely
used) reactionary populism (such as that of George Wallace in Alabama); and the populism of
politicians (that is, the style in which politicians turn to the people to increase their consensus)"
(Tarchi, 2004)[39].
Tarchi also points out that the English author distinguishes four prevalent uses of the word
people, to which four different types of populism refer.
The first possible meaning for the English author is “united people, or the nation understood
as a cohesive entity that the vocation of parties to partisanship tends to divide [. . . ]; a second
populist way of referring to the people consists in understanding it as common people, the
populace of the dispossessed, the poor, workers of humble conditions whose resentment is used
in the controversy against the ruling class, which exploits the power to enrich itself behind the
others. If the appeal favors extraordinary people [. . . ] the target of populists is the entrenchment
of professional politicians" (Tarchi, 2004)[39].
The fourth, and last, form of appeal to the people that Margaret Canovan recognizes as
proper to populism is the appeal to the people understood as “ethnic people", characterized by
an identity and a tradition that have particular roots (Tarchi, 2004)[39]; this last variation leads
us to ethnopopulism (example: Lega Nord during the Bossi era).
The exaltation of the populace is therefore at the center of the populist debate, which cele-
brates their values, beliefs and group identity. They are represented as the better part in contin-
uous contrast with strong powers that represent the political establishment and in recent years,
banking systems, bureaucracy, state centralism and supranational orders.
Two other important authors Y. Mény and Y. Surel, believe of distinguishing three unique
categories of people that often get confused (Mény, 2000) [19]:
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(i) the sovereign people intended as the legitimate actor and founder of the political order;
(ii) the nation-people, determined by geographic, linguistic or ethnic characteristics that de-
fine a common time;
(iii) The people-class, in the socio-economic sense (the plebs, the humblest part of the popu-
lation).
Populism gives to this term a new connotation which, leveraging a partial component, the
plebs, populates automatically, legitimizing to govern the entire community, thus inhibiting the
individual and polarizing society into two macro groups, Elite and ordinary people.
In populist rhetoric the Elite is an indistinct entity made up of traditional politicians, na-
tional and supranational government institutions (national Parliament, European bodies), banks,
multinationals etc.
Populist politics aims to eliminate the pluralistic aspect of a community, replacing it with
a voice, a leader and an ideology. In this scenario, populism creates a simplified ideological
chain of events that corrodes the system described above, streamlining relations between social
forces and highlighting the people in the immediate condition of understanding which part is
defending the plebs. This simplification leads to two opposing elements, the plebs on one
hand and an enemy (a not always defined one) to be defeated on the other hand, both of them
polarizing the political arena in an attempt to concentrate the consent of the electorate around
the figure of the leader, the spokesman for the malaise of the population against the injustices
of the system. The populist phenomenon therefore finds its ideal environment in the democratic
system.
Consequentially, to understand populism, a broader understanding of the relationship be-
tween itself and democracy is needed. To do this it is necessary to understand whether populism
is consequence and stimulus for democracy or it’s antithesis.
1.2 Populism: two currents of thought
Mény and Surel both put emphasis to the fact that “the populist phenomenon" could be identified
as a beneficial consequence of the democratic model. According to the two scholars, populism
is seen as a process “regenerating democracy, which, by cleaning it of all its waste, recovers
its true principles and values" (Mény, 2000)[19]. When the balance between the two corner-
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stones of democracy falters, a sense of precariousness arises in the masses that often originates
resentment of populist connotations.
The Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde, in his work entitled The Populist Zeitgeist: Gov-
ernment and Opposition (2004), states that “populism tries to shorten the growing gap between
politics and citizens by referring to the moral infallibility of the people" (Mudde, 2004)[21].
As part of the debate, we find two opposing ideologies. The first one identifies populism as a
real threat to democracy: the calling to forms of direct democracy would imply the downsizing
of constitutional guarantees, the very bulwark of democratic systems.
The second one considers that populism means appealing to the population, which has been
kept away from the management of public affairs, thus making the populace participant and not
only spectator. This current finds among its greatest exponents Ernesto Laclau who, in his work
entitled Larazón populista, defines the phenomenon “a social practice, a way of building polit-
ical space". The Argentine philosopher drastically opposes the identification of populism with
negative terms. Justifying the populist phenomenon, he defines the people “a real relationship
between social agents"; according to Laclau, it is the sum of individuals and their needs that
create the people. These needs, expressed singly by the individuals, once added together turn
into a global demand, the aim of which is to eradicate the ruling class.
Obviously, to achieve this goal the people need a charismatic leader or leadership capable of
channeling dissent, creating an anti-elitist front. According to this rhetoric, the leader embodies
the expectations of the individual through the direct leader/people relationship. Because of this,
some authors call the populist vote “an acclamation rather than an election".
According to this interpretation, populism therefore does not aspire to radically transform
the political system but to denounce its malfunction, making internal contradictions emerge
(Laclau, 2012)[14].
1.3 Populism in Europe between far right and Euroscepti-
cism
Populism constitutes the phenomenon characterizing the last twenty years in the context of
European democracies. Its form varies according to the national contexts in which it occurs.
Despite the ideological reference guidelines of the various populist formations, there are
common denominators characterized by marked antagonism towards traditional political par-
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ties. The development of forms of direct democracy or mechanisms that guarantee citizens
greater representativeness as like the fight against corruption or the adoption of social safety
nets to protect the less well-off classes. Those people were the first victims by the global eco-
nomic crisis effects resulting from the collapse of subprime mortgages and then by the sovereign
debt crisis that hit the eurozone. In fact, for these reasons, it has begun to divide coutries into
“winners against losers" of Globalization (Kriesi, 2012)[13]; this helped/contributed to ridefine
the social geography of the traditionals constituencies. Moreover, as consequence of the crisis
and of the gradual decay of the European social democracies, populism has assumed a different
connotation toward the traditional political parties belonging to europe’s right wing;
In the extreme right parties we find xenophobic connotations, related to the massive move-
ment of migrants towards Europe. Some populist parties in Western Europe that have received
the most attention in academic literature (eg.: Mudde 2007[22] ) are undoubtedly belonging to
the extreme right.
However, we must remember that populism is not necessarily a characteristic of the radical
right; there are various cases of left-wing populism (eg.: Linke in Germany or the 5-star move-
ment in Italy). We can therefore say that literature now certainly considers certain parties to be
Populists including the French Front National, the Belgian Flemish Interest , the Austrian Free-
dom Party, the Italian Lega Nord , and the Danish and Swiss People’s Parties, but there are still
some factors that makes the construction of an encyclopedia of all populist parties complicated
(Van Kessel, 2015)[41].
A first key issue is that populist rhetoric can be used at various levels, so it is not clear
when a political party should be classified as really populist or not. A second problem often
correlated with the previous one, is that populist rhetoric can be added and removed from the
repertoire of political actors in a relatively simple way, making classification for some political
parties/parties impossible.
Furthermore, another difficult issue arises from the fact that populist parties focus on issues
relevant to their particular political context and adopt an ideological program consistent with
the electorate to which they address. We must also remember that the rise of nationalism in
Europe has influenced in a decisive way, the spreading of Euroscepticism.
Many of these parties/movements complain of a reduction in the decision-making auton-
omy of the individual country and the inability of the Brussels leaders to respond to the expec-
8
Literature review
tations of European citizens. Euroscepticism is a widely shared term that describes negative
attitudes towards European integration. Taggart was the first scholar to define it, he suggested
that Euroscepticism is “the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating
outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration" (Taggart, 1998)[35].
In 2001, the collaboration between Taggart and Szczerbiak led to a more evolved version
of the definition of Euroscepticism that presents a differentiation between hard (principled) and
soft (contingent) Euroscepticism.
Hard Euroscepticism indicates the “total rejection of the entire political and economic Eu-
ropean integration project and opposition to their country that joins or remains member of the
EU " (Taggart, 2001)[36].
Vice versa weak Euroscepticism is “not a principled objection to European integration or
EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression
of qualified opposition to the EU" (Szczerbiak, 2008)[34].
Szczerbiak and Taggart’s definition of Euroscepticism is the most widely accepted in liter-
ature for a number of reasons, also because it successfully identifies Eurosceptic tendencies in
countries and party systems.
Another aspect of the question lies in the fact that during the last decades, in the entirety
of advanced industrial society, huge cultural changes have occurred leaving deep scars in more
traditionalist individuals. Migration flows, especially from low-income countries, have changed
the ethnic composition of advanced industrial societies. These new “European citizens" speak
different languages, have different religions and lifestyles than the native population. This
phenomenon generates the impression in the native population that traditional norms and values
are rapidly disappearing.
According to Ronald F. Inglehart, the rise of populist parties reflects, above all, a reaction
against a wide range of rapid cultural changes that seem to erode the basic values and customs
of Western societies (Inglehart, 2016)[11].
Inglehart suggests that the rise of populism does not only come from economic inequalities
but also from some psychological factors.
The older and less educated support parties and leaders who focus on traditional cultural
values, nationalism and xenophobia. Populists support charismatic leaders, reflecting a deep
distrust of the establishment and mainstream parties who are led by educated elites with pro-
gressive cultural visions of immigration and society.
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According to Inglehart all this leads to significant implications:
• “the growing generational gap in Western societies is likely to increase the salience of
the cultural split in party politics in the future, regardless of any improvements in the
underlying economic conditions or any potential slowdown in globalization;
• the orthogonal attraction of cultural policy generates tensions and divisions within tradi-
tional parties, as well as allowing new opportunities for left and right populist leaders to
mobilize electoral support, although it still remains difficult for populist parties to build
an organizational base and support any temporary discoveries if they enter government
coalitions and become part of the establishment. The net result is that Western societies
face more unpredictable competitions, populist challenges against the establishment to
the legitimacy of liberal democracy and potential interruptions of established competi-
tion models between parties" (Inglehart, 2016)[11].
1.4 Relevant analysis on European data
I will now proceed to report some of the most relevant empirical studies on Populism in Europe.
The first author I want to present is Stijn van Kessel , in his works he points out how
diversities of the programmatic offers proposed by populist parties are the reflection of the subtle
ideological or chameleon-like character of populism (Mudde, 2004)[21] (Stanley, 2008)[33].
According to van Kessel, the choices made by populist political parties are not random
but focus on four fundamentals themes: culture and ethnicity, economic difficulties, European
integration, corruption. He considers these four subjects compatible with the subtle ideology
of populism, which according to the political context, was presumed to be relevant also for the
electoral success of the populist parties. Van Kessel believes that the four themes mentioned
above have a positive effect on bringing an inactive electorate to the polls. In order to study
the electoral performance of populist parties in Europe, van Kessel uses an explanatory model
which included three general conditions: the electoral system; the reactivity of the established
parts; and the offer of credible populist parties. In particular, he believes that the credibility
of the populist parties depends to their electoral “appeal" and organizational cohesion (Mudde,
2007)[22].
Especially, in case of these issues being dear to a part of the electorate and that at the same
time the traditional parties were perceived being perceived incapable of finding a solution to the
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current situation. In his research the author notes that it is possible to distinguish different paths
for populist success or failure, depending on the social, economic and political context in which
they operated.
The results of his research show how populist parties have performed well in the last parlia-
mentary elections in several post-communist or Mediterranean countries affected by the crisis,
where an offer of credible populist parties has been combined with high levels of perceived
corruption and economic difficulties or high levels of nativist sentiments and Euroscepticism
(eg Greece, Hungary, Italy and Slovakia). To the contrary of any prediction some parties have
also been successful in contexts where low levels of nativism were combined with a relatively
European population, or low levels of perceived corruption (for example Belgium, Denmark
and Norway) (Van Kessel, 2015)[41].
At the same time, in some countries populist parties have not been successful despite a
seemingly favourable opportunity structure: for example, where high levels of perceived cor-
ruption have been combined with high levels of nativism or economic difficulties (eg Portugal
and Slovenia).
Ultimately these results indicate that populist success or failure is not necessarily related to
general economic conditions or dominant public attitudes towards issues central to the appeal
of many populist parties.
In a nutshell, populist parties can be successful if they manage to concentrate the unsatisfied
electorate vote (Van Hauwaert, 2018)[42].
In his most famous work, “Populist Parties in Europe, Agents of Discontent?", Van Kessel
develoups three case studies, focusing on populist parties in the Netherlands, Poland and the
United Kingdom. The results of his analysis showed that populist parties aimed to compete
with established ones based on typical populist themes: culture and ethnicity (the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom), economic difficulties and corruption (mainly Poland) and European
integration (the United Kingdom and, subsequently, the Netherlands).
The results of the three case studies brought these results: in the Netherlands and Poland,
populist parties have been successful in capitalizing on the lack of response, or lack of integrity,
of the political establishment. In Poland, populist parties rode the wave of dissatisfaction due to
the high levels of corruption attributed to traditional parties. In the UK populist parties were able
to attract a considerable part of dissatisfied voters in the elections for the European parliament
but at the same time, they failed sensationally in the national elections, as the Conservative Party
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managed to recover a large part of the votes (which had merged into BNP and UKIP) adopted a
Eurosceptic attitude and a restrictive position towards immigration (Lynch, 2013)[17].
According to the author, the reasons for this failure should be sought in the lack of credibility
of the populist parties themselves deemed incapable of managing the situation. In addition
to credibility there is another important factor, as far as the longevity of a populist party is
concerned; organizational stability (Mudde, 2007)[22].
In summary, “All in all, the study has indicated that the more successful populist parties
were those which could build up (lasting) electoral credibility, allowing them to seize the own-
ership of electorally salient issues and to appeal to dissatisfied voters. Their electoral break-
through has been facilitated where established parties could be blamed for their unresponsive-
ness or - as was the case in Poland - for their more general lack of integrity. Once a populist
party has established itself, traditional mainstream parties may not automatically win back the
support of voters if they become more responsive" (Van Kessel, 2015)[41].
It is also important to note that traditional parties are also able to take on populist conno-
tations, so we can say that populist parties are therefore not the only “agents of discontent".
This implies that populist parties should not be studied separately from their party’s political
environment and should not be treated as completely different “animals" from their electoral
competitors (Van Kessel, 2015)[41].
Many scholars have decided to investigate how the implications of the Great Recession im-
pacted on the vote for anti-establishment parties, as well as for general confidence and political
attitudes.
Some authors have found a strong relationship between rising unemployment and voting for
non-traditional parties, especially populist ones. Furthermore, according to researchs carried out
by Yann Algan et al., unemployment increases hand in hand with declining trust toward national
and European political institutions, but there are only weak or no effects of unemployment on
interpersonal trust. The correlation between unemployment and attitudes toward immigrants is
muted, especially for their cultural impact. In the end, according to their analysis, economic
insecurity resulting from the protracted economic crisis is a determining factor for populism
and political distrust (Algan, 2017)[1].
As reported in the last paragraph, Inglehart and Norris note that cultural variables outweigh
economic ones in the decision to vote for a populist party (rather than abstaining or voteing for
a non-populist party) (Inglehart, 2016)[11].
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But according to Guiso et al. this weak direct effect stems from a failure to consider that
economic security shocks significantly affect the decision to abstain (Guiso, 2017)[9].
According to them, in addition to a stronger direct effect of the economic shocks, by eval-
uating the turnout effect, a significant indirect effect is also evident: the shocks to economic
security are responsible for a strong change in political confidence and attitudes in the vis-à-
vis immigration, which means that these changes in these latter variables cannot be considered
independent factors.
In their article, “Populism :demand and supply", Guiso et al. try to answer to three funda-
mental questions:Why here is there increasing consensus for populist parties? why now? What
is driving this global shift of demand? (Guiso, 2017)[9]
The authors provide their definition of populism based on three important components:
populists claim to promote the interest of common citizens against the elites (supply rhetoric);
they pander to people’s fears and enthusiasms (demand conditions); and they promote policies
without regard to the long-term consequences (short term protections).
Their theoretical premise is that voters’ primary choice is between voting and staying home,
but, conditional on deciding to participate, they usually vote for the closest party to them ide-
ologically, as long as no populist is present yet on the supply side. In a systemic crisis, which
depresses the motivation to vote for traditional parties of both left and right, the disappointment
generates an abstention-based entry space for a populist platform (Guiso, 2017)[9].
In this article the authors focus on the demand side and voting decisions to reduce bias
and estimate the underlying demand for populism well. On the supply side they show us that
populists strategically choose their orientation. From our point of view we are interested only
in the demand side part.
Starting from what has been said, they aim to test hypotheses for the Demand Side:
1. the percentage of people voting for a populist party is increased by those who:
(a) were significantly affected by the crisis in terms of economic security (they should
be most tempted by short term protections);
(b) have a low degree of trust in the traditional parties (they are most vulnerable to the
manipulation of beliefs by populist rhetoric);
(c) have low education (because of their lower ability to evaluate long term conse-
quences of populist policies).
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2. Trust in traditional parties, institutions and politics are negatively affected by protracted
crisis.
The authors use as main source of individual data about the voters the European Social Survey
(ESS). Ess systematically tracks changing values, attitudes, attributes and behaviour patterns in
European polities.
The, ESS asks people if they voted in the last parliamentary elections in their country and
for which party they voted, giving them a turnout indicator.
Furthermore, the ESS keeps track of a large number of variables from which we select a
subset to build proxies for the characteristics of voters influencing both the turnout and voting
decisions. This vast data source has also been used to build four indicators composed from
variables present in the ESS7 dataset (2014): Economic insecurity, Trust in traditional politics
and institutions, Perception of long-run costs, Time discounting and risk aversion.
Going back to the initial hypotheses, we have that all these results are in general consistent
with Hypothesis 1. The same goes for Hypothesis 2: they conclude that economic insecurity can
be seen as a reason why people lose faith in politics, institutions and governments and increase
aversion for immigrants across the board.
In conclusion in this paper the authors show that the drivers that reduce the propensity to
vote are the same that increase the propensity to vote for populist parties. All these drivers are
strongly related to the increase of economic insecurity. The rare combination of markets and
governments inability to provide security in the last crisis leaves many people with unprece-
dented fears and create the condition for an increase in numbers of populist parties in Europe.
“The factor that we highlight as key for understanding both demand and supply of populism
is electoral participation. We show that abstentionism, the disillusionment effect, which the
literature generally ignores, makes economic insecurity appear to be the real driver of populism
on the demand side. [. . . ]
Examination of the interaction between this rhetoric (the key element of populist supply
strategy) and economic insecurity (the key driver of populist demand) has been shown to be
very useful in understanding how trust and attitudes towards migration evolves. Populism does
not have cultural causes, but rather an economic insecurity causes, with an important and
traceable cultural channel" (Guiso, 2017)[9].
Conversly, Bakker et al tried to investigate what leads to voting for populist parties from a
psychological point of view.They theorized that a low score on the personality trait Agreable-
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ness should predict voting for populist parties;
“ individuals who belongs to this group are egoistic, distrusting towards other, intolerant, unco-
operative and express antagonism towards others (McCrae 1996: 329); applying these traits in
the political domain, low agreeable individuals are more distrusting of politicians (Mondak &
Halperin 2008) and politics (Dinesen et al. 2014), less efficacious (Mondak & Halperin 2008)
and more likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Swami et al. 2010)." (Bakker, 2016)[2] This
matches the essential common denominator of populist parties: the anti-establishment message
(Rooduijn 2014)[28], which they combine with a host ideology and the portrayal of the political
elite disinterested in common people and working for their own gain (Mudde 2004)[21].
This can be demonstrated also by the congruency principle, that states that voters select politi-
cians whose traits match their own traits (Caprara & Zimbardo) [4]
Futhermore we need to mention a very interesting work by Ian R. Gordon, which although re-
stricted to the UK scenario only and the Brexit vote has many revealing aspects on how and
what pushes people to vote for populist parties.
Gordon tries to understand the geography of recent populist movements in Europe in terms
of general political economy, paying attention to the interaction between political and economic
processes on a subnational (local and/or regional) scale (Gordon, 2018)[8].
To state this Gordon tests 2 main hypotheses:
1. The internationalization that has taken place in recent decades has generated three types
of shock or stress to certain communities, in particular to some groups that may be par-
ticularly exposed to them.
2. Given the shock, those who are more likely to support a populist movement will be
those who have decided to pursue professions characterized by professional qualifications
compared to a university career, and those not affiliated with civil society organizations
(churches and unions).
The results of the study on Brexit vote and the 2014 European elections in the UK show that
as regards the first hypothesis, on the groups that could react to particular stresses imposed on
them through internationalization, only one is clearly supported by the evidence. The second
hypothesis, on the meaning of the factors that can be associated with local rather than cos-
mopolitan orientations (types of qualification and/or organizational affiliation), the evidence
provides much clearer support for the hypothesis. In conclusion, as already expressed in the
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literature, Gordon points out that persistent patterns of uneven economic development among
various regions could lead to a political crisis. The same goes for multiple micro-level guesses
that link an anti-establishment revolt or economic vulnerability or working-class status. In the
analysis of the support for populist parties, evidence was found of radically different responses
by several groups to the same sources of cultural shock.
“In particular, this was found to apply to groups with different types of qualification, reflect-
ing a localist/cosmopolitan divide associated with different kinds of stake in stability, but also
to ones with differing trans-local connections. The balance between these is not, however, just
an arbitrary fact about particular places but (we should assume) outcomes of the sequence
of economic roles they have played (as Massey, 1995, proposed). This might perhaps explain
why, when recent economic change seems fairly irrelevant to the local strength of populism,
very long-term structural changes do seem to have a bearing (Langella, 2016)[15]" (Gordon,
2018)[8].
According to Yann Algan et al. the loss of confidence in national and European political
institutions and the increase in populism are linked to the increase in unemployment caused by
the crisis. Even a temporary rise in unemployment can lead to political spillovers, which in turn
would result in anti-market policies that undermine long-term growth. In this case, a severe
recession could have had negative economic repercussions (Algan, 2017)[1].
Dustman et al. (2017) [7] reach similar results showing that in the aftermath of the crisis
mistrust of European institutions, largely explained by the poorer economic conditions of the
Euro-area countries, is correlated with the populist vote.
So, we had to ask ourselves what can be done to reduce economic security and increase
political confidence in Europe? Some proposals could be:
• as supported by many studies, given the high vulnerability of unskilled workers to the
crisis, it would be appropriate to specifically support this population group (education
and training);
• national and EU authorities should pursue supply-side reforms of labor, capital and prod-
uct markets, as well as pan-European counter-cyclical fiscal policies;
• the EU should prioritize growth-enhancing investments such as research, innovation and




Werts et al. found that Euroscepticism actually helps explain the vote for a far-right party
beyond the perception of ethnic threat and political distrust.
At the same time euro-scepticism is much less relevant than perceived ethnic threat in ex-
plaining why particular social categories, i.e. lower educated people, manual workers, un-
employed people and non-churchgoers are more likely to vote for the radical right (Werts,
2013)[43].
As Immerzeel & Pickup point out (Immerzeel, 2015)[12] although some previous research
has shown that much of the typical electorate for the populist radical right parties (PRR) is
made up of low-educated unemployed workers and/or people with negative attitudes towards
immigrants (Lubbers, 2002)[16], These groups aren’t composed of inactive voters, indeed, most
of the votes received by the PRR come from a segment of the population that from the beginning
was voting, probably for another right-wing party (Van der Meer, 2012)[40]. These groups are
not composed of inactive voters, in fact, most of the votes received by the populist radical right
parties come from a segment of the population that was already part of the active electorate, so
these votes were probably stolen from traditional right-wing parties (Van der Meer, 2012)[40].
The analyzes of Immerzeel & Pickup reveal the existence of a split between West and East
Europe regarding the change in voter turnout when a new populist party (competitive/credible)
is presented in the elections.
In Western Europe, we find that the likelihood of voting increases politically once a populist
radical right parties is more successful; conversely, they note that in Eastern Europe typical
PRR supporters are less affected by the increase in popularity. Furthermore, their results show
that workers with a lower education level and blue collar workers are not generally concerned,
while others with a higher education level and other sectors are generally demobilized by more
popular PRRs.
“These negative effects of PRR success on voter turnout in Eastern Europe are an impor-
tant indication that PRRs using a strong anti-rhetoric in countries with a shorter history of
democracy may pose a ‘threat to democracy’" (Immerzeel, 2015)[12].
Ultimately Immerzeel & Pickup speculate about differences in those affected by a success-
ful PRR. From their results, we note that young Eastern European citizens who are relatively
new to politics may be more strongly influenced by the negative anti-rhetoric of the Eastern
European PRRs. Conversely, Western European youth are not influenced by popular Western
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European PRRs. According to the authors, a possible explanation could be given by the fact
that in Western Europe PRRs are seen as niche parties that should not be taken seriously and
therefore do not really influence people’s voting behaviour.
In conclusion, I would like to talk about the fact that part of the empirical literature has shown
how women are less inclined to vote for populist parties. Mudde refers to the argument as the
low efficacy theory’ (Mudde, 2007) [22] and argues "that the gendered nature of support for the
PRR may have less to do with the ideas of the parties in question and more to do with the image
of the parties as radical or even extreme parties. Because women often have lower levels of po-
litical efficacy and lower levels of political interest, they are more likely to vote for established




Data were derived from the European Social Survey (ESS), the richest social scientific en-
deavor to map attitudes, beliefs, and behavior patterns in Europe. The project is well known
for the exceptionally high methodological standards of the design and of the operation of the
project. It is part of the European Science Foundation’s initiative to obtain a cross-cultural
comparative research design. Data has been collected every two years, since September 2002,
by face-to-face interviews. The ESS systematically tracks changing values, attitudes, attributes
and behavior patterns in European polities. It covers all European countries, though not every
country participates in every wave. Respondents were selected by means of strict probability
sampling of the resident populations aged 15 years and older. Response rates of 70% apply
to most countries. In total, 36 European countries participated in at least one of the eight ESS
waves (in wave 9 "2018-2019" will become 38 with the addition of Serbia and Montenegro).
To test our hypotheses, we use the eight available waves, the ninth is under construction and
data are only available for a few countries, from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002-2003,
2004-2005, 2006-2007,2008-2009; 2010-2011, 2012-2013,2014-2015 and 2016-2017). First
of all, we selected the countries that had participated in all the ESS rounds; Only 15 countries
have met this requirement. The countries are Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom. Furthermore, a country must have at least one populist party and / or a radical right-
wing party and / or a Eurosceptic party, because we are mainly interested in understanding what
effects demographic, geographic, labor market and cultural variables have on proximity or on
the vote for populist parties and / or a radical right-wing parties and / or a Eurosceptic parties;
However, with the exception of Portugal where only the Eurosceptic category is present, the
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other countries present all three categories. Table 2.1 highlights the density of observations for
each country. Germany is the country with the most observations, conversely Slovenia is the
one with the least observations among the 15 countries observed. (la Tabella è gia stata inserita
e modificata in data sul latex)
country freq pct cumpct
BE 14343 6.23 6.23
CH 13860 6.02 12.25
DE 23342 10.14 22.40
ES 15501 6.74 29.13
FI 16200 7.04 36.17
FR 15051 6.54 42.71
GB 17626 7.66 50.37
HU 13132 5.71 56.07
IE 18247 7.93 64.00
NL 15186 6.60 70.60
NO 13248 5.76 76.36
PL 14124 6.14 82.49
PT 14988 6.51 89.01
SE 14390 6.25 95.26
SI 10914 4.74 100.00
Total 230152 100.00
Table 2.1: Density by country
The questionnaire consists of a core module, constant from round to round and smaller
rotating modules, repeated at intervals, on selected substantive topics. We will use only the
core module because its presents in every round and covers a wide range of social, economic,




Demographic and socio-economic variables
The demographic and socio-economic variables examined were: age, gender, education, domi-
cile, labor market variables and variables for economic insecurity.
The dataset is composed by 47,3% male and 52,7% female with an age between 14 and 123
years old. We create Male, is a dummy variable with score 1 for males and score 0 for females.
Age was calculated based on year of birth and year of interview, 0.01% have more than 97 year
and 0.21% more than 90. The average age of the respondents is around 48 which means that
most people that responded to the questionnaire were adults and elderly people between 30 and
70 years old.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of respondents according to age
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of respondents according to the level of education completed, expressed
in years
Regarding the level of education, we decided to use the years of full-time education com-
pleted in order to have a more precise value of the person’s level of education compared to
the International Standard Classification of Education). The question from which it is derived
is: “About how many years of education have you completed, whether full-time or part-time?
Please report these in full-time equivalents and include compulsory years of schooling".
Employment status is based on the item that asks respondents for the best description of their
current main activity for the last 7 days. We recoded this item into different dummy variables
with the following categories unemployed, actively searching for a job, unemployed, not ac-
tively searching for a job (inactive), employed, Education(student), retired and other (other
/military service/housework). We used the other category as the reference category.
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Data
Figure 2.3: Distribution of "current main activity for the last 7 days"
We capture heterogeneity in economic insecurity with four measures. First, whether the
respondent has ever been unemployed, forcing search for a new job; related question: “Have
you ever been unemployed and seeking work for a period of more than three months?".
Feeling about household’s income nowadays Freq. Percent Cum.
Living comfortably on present income 75,596 33.62 33.62
Coping on present income 104,328 46.40 80.02
Difficult on present income 34,547 15.37 95.39
Very difficult on present income 10,368 4.61 100.00
Total 224,839 100.00
Table 2.2: Feeling about household’s income nowadays
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Second, as a measure of perceived deprivation was measured by asking respondents how
they felt about their households income nowadays, ranging from living comfortably on present
income to finding it very difficult on present income.2.2 Related question: “Which of the de-
scriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowa-
days?"
We recoded this item into a dummy variable; this variable assume value 1 when respondents
have some difficult on present income. For the third indicator we crossed occupation variables
with type of contract variable in order to construct a dummy variable for permanent contract,
1 permanent 0 otherwise. As a last proxy for economic insecurity we have created a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 if "The main source of income of households comes from in-
vestments, savings, etc , 0 "otherwise"; linked by question "Please consider the income of all
household members and any income which may be received by the household as a whole. What
is the main source of income in your household?". We have also added as control the variable
income in classes which is based on the following question “please tell me which letter de-
scribes your household’s total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources?
If you don’t know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you
know best: weekly, monthly or annual income." The categories are national categories, based
on deciles of the actual household income range in the given country. The deciles should be
derived from the best available source for the country.
Figure 2.4: Income in classes
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The variable Domicile identifies the area of a respondent’s residence and has five categories:
in a farm/at the countryside, country village, town/small city, suburb/outskirts or big city. These
are included as a series of binary variables with big city used as the reference category.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of domicile across the population
An interesting variable that we have tried to use in combination with domicil is the subjec-
tive perception of crime. It was measured by the question Feeling of safety of walking alone
in local area after dark, with an 4 point response scale 1 Very safe - 4 Very unsafe. We are
interested in whether those who do not feel safe decide to change political alignment towards
populist or far-right parties that often make “security" one of their flags. So, we recoded this
variable in “feeling unsafe", 1 if respondent feels “unsafe" or “ very unsafe ".
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feeling unsafe Freq. Percent Cum.
0 182,076 79.71 79.71
1 46,347 20.29 100.00
Total 228,423 100.00
Table 2.3: Distribution of feeling unsafe of walking alone in local area after dark
Anti-immigrant attitudes
Anti-immigrant attitudes measure the respondent’s attitudes towards immigrants (Schneider,
2008) (Schneider, 2008)[30]. We use the following items that were available in all waves of the
ESS: “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country’s] economy that people come to
live here from other countries?" with an 11 point response scale 0 bad for the economy - 10
good for the economy; “Would you say that [country’s] cultural life is undermined or enriched
by people coming to live here from other countries" with an 11 point response scale 0 cultural
life is undermined - 10 cultural life is enriched; “Is [country] made a worse or better place to
live by people coming here from other countries?" with an 11 point response scale 0 worse place
to live - 10 better place to live; “How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe?"
with an 4 point response scale 1 Allow many to come and live here- 4 Allow none;“to what
extent do you think [country] should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most
[country] people to come and live here?" with an 4 point response scale 1 Allow many to come
and live here- 4 Allow none; and “How about people of a different race or ethnic group from
most [country] people?" with an 4 point response scale 1 Allow many to come and live here- 4
Allow none.
Aptitude and cultural variables
A very useful information for the purposes of our study is the political alignment of the in-
terviewees. The possible responses were reported in the form of grades from 0 to 10 where 0
represent the left and 10 represent the right. The 10.95% of the sample population gave NA
responses that were coded as missing values. Most the answers are located in the grades from
1 to 5 and the mean of the total answer is 5 which indicates that the majority of the population
would place themselves between left and right.
26
Data
Placement on left right scale Freq. Percent Cum.
Left 6,386 3.12 3.12
1 4,220 2.06 5.18
2 11,681 5.70 10.87
3 22,078 10.77 21.65
4 22,030 10.75 32.40
5 68,330 33.34 65.74
6 20,631 10.07 75.81
7 22,680 11.07 86.87
8 16,428 8.02 94.89
9 4,596 2.24 97.13
Right 5,879 2.87 100.00
Total 204,939 100.00
Table 2.4: Placement on left right scale across population
To get a more drastic result also in this case the original variable was transformed into a dummy
where 1 stands for affiliation with “extreme right partie" and 0 stands for affiliation with the
“left parties". The sub-categories “1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6" were added to “left" while the others
sub-categories “7, 8 and 9" were added to “right". From the analysis of the variable it seemed
that the majority, 75.8% of the population, placed themselves into the left part while only 24.2%
choose the extreme right.
Cultural variables related to the far-right ideology
In ESS there are relevant cultural variables related to the far-right ideology: To measure homo-
phobic attitude we use the following question : what extent you agree or disagree with each
of the following statements. Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they
wish" with an 5 point response scale 1 Agree strongly- 5 Disagree strongly;
To measure attachment to traditions we use the following question: “Now I will briefly describe
some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not
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like you. Use this card for your answer. Tradition is important to her/him. She/he tries to follow
the customs handed down by her/his religion or her/his family" with an 6 point response scale
1 Very much like me- 6 Not like me at all;
Authoritarianism (i.e. support for law and order) was measured with this item:“Now I will
briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each
person is or is not like you. Use this card for your answer.It is important to her/him that the
government ensures her/his safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it
can defend its citizens" with an 6 point response scale 1 Very much like me- 6 Not like me at all.
In a nutshell, people were asked to what extent they think it is important to behave properly, that
the government is strong and ensures safety, and it is important to do what is told and follow
the rules.
Extremist attitude was measured with this item: “what extent you agree or disagree with each of
the following statements Political parties that wish to overthrow democracy should be banned"
with an 5 point response scale 1 Agree strongly- 5 Disagree strongly(present only in the first 5
rounds);
Measure of trust
In addition, there are many variables that measure trust and satisfaction for national and inter-
national politicians and institutions. Political distrust was measured using three items. Two of
them were about trust:trust in politicians and trust in political parties and the other was about
satisfied about how democracy works in your country. Measure of mistrust in national gover-
nance: “on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out.
0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...
...politicians?" with an 11 point response scale 1 No trust at all- 10 Complete trust; “on a score
of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not
trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ...political parties?"
with an 11 point response scale 1 No trust at all- 10 Complete trust; “And on the whole, how
satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?" with an 11 point response scale
1 Extremely dissatisfied- 10 Extremely satisfied;
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Data
Figure 2.6: Box plot of trust in political parties
Figure 2.7: Box plot of trust in politicians
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Measure of mistrust in Europe: on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of
the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have
complete trust. Firstly... ...the European Parliament? with an 11 point response scale 1 No trust
at all- 10 Complete trust;
Figure 2.8: Box plot of trust in European Parliament
and “Now thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go
further. Others say it has already gone too far. Using this card, what number on the scale best
describes your position?" with an 11 point response scale 1 ’Unification already gone too far-
10 Unification go further’.
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Figure 2.9: Histogram of European unification go further or gone too far
Figure 2.10: Box plot of European unification go further or gone too far
31
2.2 Dependent variables
As already mentioned, the purpose of our research is to understand what factors can influence
the closeness or the vote for three types of parties (Populist, Far-right party, Eurosceptic). To
do this we based ourselves on the material present in the literature, in our case we decided to
adopt what was done by "The PopuList Team"; The PopuList is the result of close coopera-
tion between academics and journalists, initiated by The Guardian (Rooduijn, 2019)[29]. The
list consists of European parties that can be classified as populist, far right, far left and/or Eu-
rosceptic, and obtained at least 2% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election
since 1998. The list has been thoroughly peer-reviewed by more than 30 academics. As we
just said, Populist parties, Far-right party and Eurosceptic party were identified by more than
30 academics and to do that they use these three definitions:
Populist parties: parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people
(Mudde 2004)[21].
Far right parties: parties that are nativist (which is an ideology that holds that states should
be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that nonnative elements are fun-
damentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state) and authoritarian (which is the belief
in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely)
(Mudde 2007)[22].
Eurosceptic parties: parties that express the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well
as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration.
This includes both hard Euroscepticism (i.e., outright rejection of the entire project of Euro-
pean political and economic integration, and opposition to ones country joining or remaining
a member of the EU) and soft Euroscepticism (i.e., contingent or qualified opposition to Euro-
pean integration) (Taggart, 2004)[37].
The PopuList is supported by the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research, The Guardian,
and the ECPR Standing Group on Extremism and Democracy. In particular, The Guardian cre-
ated a set of maps in order to track the success of populist parties in Europe.
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Figure 2.11: Spread of populist consensus across Europe in 2002
Figure 2.12: Spread of populist consensus across Europe in 2016
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Country Party Populist Far right Eurosceptic
Belgium VB x x x
Belgium PVDA/PTB x
Belgium LDD x
Belgium FN x x x
Finland Ps x x x
Finland VAS x
Finland SIN x x
France FN x x x
France PCF/FdG x
France FI x x
Germany Linke x x
Germany AfD x x x
Hungary FIDESZ x x x
Hungary Jobbik x x x
Hungary MIÉP x x x
Hungary MMP x
Ireland SF x x
Ireland SP x
Netherlands PVV x x x
Netherlands SP x x
Netherlands PvdD x
Netherlands SGP x
Netherlands LPF x x x
Netherlands 50 PLUS x





Poland PiS x x x
Poland Kukiz ’15 x x x
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Poland LPR x x x
Poland Liberty x x
Poland Razem
Poland SRP x x
Portugal BE x
Portugal CDU x
Slovenia ZdLe / L x x
Slovenia SNS x x
Slovenia LMS x
Spain Podemos x x
Spain IU x
Sweden SD x x x
Sweden V x
Switzerland SVP x x x
United Kingdom UKIP x x x
United Kingdom Con x
United Kingdom DUP x
Count:15 48 28 18 45
Table 2.5: Parties list
National election results since 1998 were then mapped on to the party definitions to show
trends over time, we show only the snapshot situation in 2002 and 2016, the starting point and
the end of our data. Figures 2.11 2.12 shows how populism flickered across the continent in
the late 1990s before really catching on in eastern Europe throughout the 2000s. It spread north
in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis before making substantial inroads in western
Europes major powerhouses in the past three years.
It is important to note that a single party may have one or more of these three attributes at the
same time, this can be seen from the table 2.5
For example, in Germany "Alternative Fur Deutschland" has all three attributes having been
classified as a populist, Eurosceptic and far-right party. Conversely, the Spanish "Podemos"
was configured as a Populist party, Eurosceptic but not as an extreme right party. Thanks to this
list and the Ess dataset, we have created 12 dependent variables, four types for each of the three
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party categories (populist, Eurosceptic and far-right party).
The first type of variable is created through the following question: “Is there a particular politi-
cal party you feel closer to than all the other parties?", if the respondent answers "yes", then the
interviewer asks him to indicate which party in his country he feels close to at that specific mo-
ment. So, with this type of variables we can have an indication of how the respondent positions
himself at that particular moment. In the following table we have some descriptive statistics
of the three dependent variables that express closeness to a party belonging to the categories
examined.
Feel closer to a particular party




Table 2.6: Frequency table for the variable "Feel closer to a particular party"
In this variable, respondents who feel close to populist/radical right/eurosceptic parties re-
ceived a value of 1, whereas the rest of respondents in the survey receive a value of 0.
Variable n◦oss min max mean sd
Close to pop 109324 0 1 0,13 0,33
Close to far right 109324 0 1 0,09 0,29
Close to eurosceptic 109324 0 1 0,19 0,4
Table 2.7: Descriptive table about closeness to populist, far right and eurosceptic variables
Variable closeness to closeness to closeness to
populist party far right party eurosceptic party
closeness to populist party 1.0000
closeness to far right party 0.8329 1.0000
closeness to eurosceptic party 0.7649 0.6575 1.0000
Table 2.8: Correlations between closeness to populist, far right and eurosceptic variables
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Often populist parties have a far right and/or eurosceptic connotation, which explains the
high correlations between the three dependent variables shown in table 2.8.
Conversely, the second type of variable is no longer based on where the interviewee is politically
positioned at the moment but tells us what the individual’s preference was in the last election.
The second type of variables is created through the following question:“ Some people don’t
vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election
in [month/year]?", if the respondent answers "yes", then the interviewer asks him to indicate





Not eligible to vote 18,297 8.02
Total 226,352 100.00
Table 2.9: Descriptive table about closeness to populist, far right and eurosceptic variables
In this variable, respondents who vote for populist radical right parties received a value of
1, whereas the rest of respondents in the survey receive a value of 0.
Variable n◦oss min max mean sd
Vote for pop 144024 0 1 0,13 0,33
Vote for far right 144401 0 1 0,1 0,3
Vote for eurosceptic 144987 0 1 0,19 0,39
Table 2.10: Descriptive table for vote for populist, far right and eurosceptic variables
Often populist parties have a far right and/or eurosceptic connotation, which explains the high
correlations between the three dependent variables shown above.
Analysing the two tables about dependent variables means and std.dev. we notice that the
percentages are very similar. The closeness to a populist party stands at 13% as well as the
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Variable vote for populist vote for far_right vote for eurosceptic
party party party
vote for populist party 1.0000
vote for far_right party 0.8492 1.0000
vote for eurosceptic party 0.7764 0.6828 1.0000
Table 2.11: Correlations between vote for populist, far right and eurosceptic variables
indication of the vote. The same goes for the variables associated with the extreme right and
Euroscepticism, which stand respectively at 10% and 19%.
For both types of variables we have a consistent number of observations. For the variables that
express "closeness to a party" we have 109,324 observations, slightly less than half of the indi-
viduals in the original dataset (47.5%) expressed that they felt close to a specific party. We have
a higher response rate than the previous one in the declaration of the vote in the last elections,
where 62.7% of the respondents replied that they had voted and for whom.
Based on literature, we used some cultural attitudes and variables to define which people should,
in theory, orient themselves towards populist and/or Eurosceptic and/or on the far-right ideolo-
gies. By analyzing these variables we created two indicators of affection for one of the three
categories. The first one is based on exceeding a certain threshold while the second requires
that the respondent presents all the characteristics under consideration. Let’s now define which
variables were used for the creation of the indicators and the thresholds for the first, the least
stringent indicator.
For the creation of the closeness indicator for populist ideology we used a recoded version
of the following variables:
ESS 1-8 variable Question topic
and range ess
variable






Mistrust in national governance
trstplt Trust in politi-
cians









Scale 0-10 Mistrust in politi-
cal parties





Scale 0-10 Dissatisfied with
democracy








If impcntr = 3or4
imbgeco Immigration bad
or good for coun-
try’s economy
Scale 0-10 Immigration bad
for economy









If imueclt < 5
Table 2.12: Recoding table, in the last column we report the conditions to be satisfied for the
dummy variable to be equal to 1
Taking into account that the variable “trstprt" is not present in the first round, the indicator
will have 2 different thresholds. For the data belonging to the first wave, it will suffice that at
least 4 out of 5 dummy are verified to "turn on" our index. As for the subsequent waves, we will
need at least 5 out of 6 dummy to obtain the same result. According to the constructed index,
only 10.8% of respondents would be compatible with a populist alignment.
For the creation of the closeness indicator for the ideology of the far right we used a recoded
version of the following variables, some of which are in common with the index for populism:
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ESS 1-8 variable Question topic
and range ess
variable





























Scale 0-4 No-immigr same If imsmetn=







Scale 0-4 No-immigr diff If imdfetn





Scale 0-10 Imm bad for cn-
try
If imwbcnt < 5∼
44%
Cultural values
lrscale Placement on left
right scale




freehms Gays and les-
bians free to live
life as they wish
Scale 1-5 No gay If freehms = 3 |



















Scale 1-6 Follow Tradi-
tions
If imptrad= 1 |
2 ∼ 48%
Table 2.13: Recoding table, in the last column we report the conditions to be satisfied for the
dummy variable to be equal to 1
Taking into account that the variable “Prtyban" is present only in round 1 to round 5, the
indicator will have 2 different thresholds. For the data belonging to wave 1 to 5 , it will suffice
that at least 7 out of 10 dummy are verified to "turn on" our index. As for the subsequent waves,
we will need at least out of 6 out of 9 dummy to obtain the same result. According to the con-
structed index, only 10.3% of respondents would be compatible with a far-right alignment
Finally, we are now going to explain the variables used to construct the closeness indicator
for Eurosceptic parties
ESS 1-8 variable Question topic
and range ess
variable







trstep Trust in the Euro-
pean Parliament
Scale 0-10 Mistrust in Eu
Parlament








or gone too far
Scale 0-10 Stop Europe If euftf< 3 ∼
27%
Table 2.14: Recoding table, in the last column we report the conditions to be satisfied for the
dummy variable to be equal to 1
If at least one of the two variables assumes value 1 then the index will indicate that the re-
pondent is probably Eurosceptic. According to the constructed index, only 20% of respondents
would be compatible with a Eurosceptic alignment.
Variable n◦oss min max mean sd
Idx pop 230152 0 1 0,11 0,31
Idx far right 225193 0 1 0,1 0,3
Idx eurosceptic 218489 0 1 0,2 0,4
Table 2.15: Summary statistics of our Indexes, simple type, based on population
As previously specified, this second indicator, the strong index, is by definition more stringent
than the first one because it requires that all the previous characteristics occur.
Variable n◦oss min max mean sd
Strict idx pop 230152 0 1 0,04 0,2
Strict idx far right 230152 0 1 0,04 0,2
Strict idx eurosceptic 230152 0 1 0,13 0,33
Table 2.16: Summary statistics of our Indexes, strict type, based on population
Unfortunately for the indicator regarding the affiliation to the far right we had to slightly
relax the threshold; as otherwise not even 0.01% of respondents would have been compatible.
Therefore, for the data belonging to wave 1 to 5 , it will suffice that at least 9 out of 10 dummy
are verified to "turn on" our index. As for the subsequent waves, we will need at least out of 8
out of 9 dummy variables to obtain the same result.
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For a better comparison between the results of the analyses derived from the variables feeling
of closeness to the parties and the indexes, presented above, we have built two more indexes.
These new indices are simply a sub-sample of those presented above. We have narrowed down
the observations cosidering only who reponded positively to the question: “Is there a particular
political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?"
Variable n◦oss min max mean sd
Idx_2 pop 109324 0 1 0,08 0,27
Idx_2 far right 109324 0 1 0,11 0,31
Idx_2 eurosceptic 109324 0 1 0,18 0,4
Table 2.17: Summary statistics of our Indexes, simple type, based on respondents
Variable n◦oss min max mean sd
Strict idx_2 pop 109324 0 1 0,03 0,17
Strict idx_2 far right 109324 0 1 0,013 0,11
Strict idx_2 eurosceptic 109324 0 1 0,12 0,33





The aim of the analysis is to study how certain socio-economic, geographical, attitudinal and
cultural characteristics influence:
• the closeness to a party assimilable in one of the three categories listed above (populism,
extreme right, Euroscepticism).
• the vote expressed in one of the three categories listed above. The vote in spite of the
closeness could be influenced by other logics, for example the credibility of the party; if
the interviewee believes that the vote could be wasted for some reason (e.g. difficulty in
overcoming the barrier and/or inability to coalition with other political actors to govern),
he could decide to invest his vote in another party, which is more credible than the party
he feels closer to.
In addition, we created two types of indicators from opinion variables (attitudinal and cultural)
that we considered relevant. Therefore, these indexes were created in such a way as to divide
the sample into thought groups. The basic idea is to look for opinion and/or cultural variables
that allow us to state, in a simplistic way, that an individual who meets these criteria can be
catalogued as "close to the populist ideology" and/or extreme right-wing ideology and/or Eu-
rosceptic ideology. For example, "Mr. White" is one of the interviewees, he expresses negative
opinions about the arrival of new migrants in his country (regardless of whether they come from
poor or rich countries, whether they are of his own ethnicity or not), supports homophobic posi-
tions, is in favour of restricting his and others’ freedom in exchange for increased security, is a
conservative and, finally, his declared political orientation is right-wing. So, given the premises,
we assume that the individual "Mr. White" is probably close to ideologies ascribable to the ex-
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treme right.
We have created these indexes, both the simple and the rigorous version, using the entire sam-
ple. In a second moment we decided to perform the analysis also for a sub-sample of these
indexes, that is we kept only the individuals who answered positively to the question "do you
feel close to a party in your country?" in order to offer a more precise comparison with the other
analyses.
In fact, in this chapter we will report only the results for the indices belonging to the second
group; however, the analyses have been carried out for both categories and the results are re-
ported in the appendix.
We would also like to point out that all the analyses were conducted both by country (as re-
ported in this chapter) and by region, but since they were essentially identical we preferred to
focus only on country analyses.
Given the high number of observations present in our sample, we decided to proceed through
OLS analysis even if we are dealing with a binomial dependent response variable (i.e. vote for
a populist / far-right / Eurosceptic party against any other party).
All the models built in this chapter are OLS probability models structured as shown in Equations
3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4:
Yjh = β0 +β1 ·Xdem +βc1 · xcountry +βc2 · xwave (3.1)
Yjh = β0 +β1 ·Xdem +β2 ·Xdom +βc1 · xcountry +βc2 · xwave (3.2)
Yjh = β0 +β1 ·Xdem +β2 ·Xdom +β3 ·Xmkt lab+
+βc1 · xcountry +βc2 · xwave +βc3 · xincome (3.3)
Yjh = β0 +β1 ·Xdem +β2 ·Xdom +β3 ·Xmkt lab +β4 ·Xcult val+
+βc1 · xcountry +βc2 · xwave +βc3 · xincome (3.4)
where Xi is a matrix of predictors belonging to the set of variables specified by class i, Yjh
is the dependent variable ( j refers to one out the three considered categories of political parties,
h refers to type of dependent variable - closeness, vote, simple index or strict index), and βi is a
vector of coefficients estimated through OLS.
Coefficients labeled as c1, c2 or c3 refer to control variables, which will not be displayed in
the model summary. Their purpose is to absorb effects which are not included in the analysis’
perimeter directly, but they may influence the other coefficients. These variables ,codified as
categorical, are country, wave and income classes declared respectively.
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The classes of independent variables are the same across all sections, but the predictors consid-
ered may vary depending on the studied model; for example, the analysis about the populism
takes into account measures of distrustness about political parties and politics, whereas the anal-
ysis about far right takes into consideration the respondents’opinions about the importance of
traditions and homosexuality.
Given the importance of the domicile of the residents in the analysis, we run two different mod-
els on two subsamples. The former is built from the observations of respondents living in an
urban area (big city and suburbs), the latter is built from respondents living in a small or rural
area (small city, country village and home in countryside). These two models differ only by the
respondents’ location, so we can compare the coefficients of these regressions analysing their
confidence intervals.




3.1.1 Closeness to populist party

















Age -6.85e-06 -7.11e-05 -0.000621* -0.000558 -0.000299











(2.70e-06) (2.71e-06) (3.74e-06) (3.90e-06) (4.13e-06)
Education (years) -0.00674*** -0.00656*** -0.00505*** -0.00264*** -0.00264***
(0.000242) (0.000247) (0.000284) (0.000294) (0.000311)
Sex(male) 0.0230*** 0.0229*** 0.0270*** 0.0273*** 0.0291***
(0.00186) (0.00186) (0.00205) (0.00213) (0.00226)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00413 0.00696* 0.00346 0.00505
Suburbs (0.00341) (0.00369) (0.00373) (0.00397)
Domicile = 3, 0.00664** 0.00796** 0.00351 0.00659**
Small city (0.00286) (0.00312) (0.00316) (0.00334)
Domicile = 4, 0.0139*** 0.0167*** 0.00905*** 0.0107***
Country village (0.00290) (0.00319) (0.00326) (0.00344)
Domicile = 5, 0.00321 0.00449 -0.000745 0.00263
Home in countryside (0.00413) (0.00448) (0.00454) (0.00478)
Market Labor
Low income (perceived) 0.0289*** 0.0120*** 0.0127***
(0.00315) (0.00325) (0.00345)




Indefinite contract -0.000581 0.00263 0.00499
(0.00307) (0.00308) (0.00327)
Being richer -0.0179* -0.0165* -0.0233**
(0.00963) (0.00971) (0.0105)
Student -0.0309*** -0.0193*** -0.0211***
(0.00503) (0.00506) (0.00544)
Unemployed, actively -0.00230 -0.00399 -0.00594
looking for job (0.00628) (0.00635) (0.00670)
unemployed, NOT 0.0200** 0.0156* 0.0153
actively looking for job (0.00856) (0.00868) (0.00930)
Retired -0.00646 -0.00911** -0.0106**
(0.00430) (0.00442) (0.00472)
Unemployed (3 months+) 0.0245*** 0.0227*** 0.0230***
(0.00250) (0.00253) (0.00268)
Cultural values




Unsatisfied of democracy 0.0514*** 0.0508***
(0.00264) (0.00283)
Anti Poor Immigrant 0.0399*** 0.0406***
(0.00239) (0.00254)
Anti-immigr culture 0.0581*** 0.0584***
(0.00293) (0.00310)
Immigr is bad 0.0290*** 0.0314***
for economy (0.00265) (0.00283)
Feeling unsafe 0.00753*** 0.00702**
(0.00292) (0.00311)
Constant 0.115*** 0.105*** 0.132*** 0.0382*** 0.0154
(0.00827) (0.00860) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0129)
Observations 108,404 108,291 90,412 85,437 76,017
R-squared 0.180 0.180 0.168 0.189 0.199
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Country dummy YES YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.1: Closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy
The overall effect of age remains significant through the nested models; sometimes the prevalent
part of the effect is linear, sometimes the quadratic part lead the effect. Both have a negative
effect on the probability to feel close to populist parties, which means that the probability to
feel close to such parties is higher at a young age. For instance, a 20 years old has a +5.6%
probability to feel close to such parties with respect to a 60 years old.
As we expect, the years of educations completed has a negative effect on this probability,
whereas male respondents are more likely to feel close to this category of parties than female
ones.
Regarding the domicile of the respondents, its effects and significance vary across the models
considered. But an underlyng pattern can be found: as we move away from the big cities, the
probability to feel close to populist parties increases. The effect of this variable is complex, and
related to other variables included in the some of the models considered: as we can see, between
model (3) and (4) part of the effect is absorbed by aptitudinal and cultural values variables.
We have no statistical evidence to state that respondents living in a farm or an home in country-
side are different from people living in a big city. A possible explanation about this phenomenon
could be the following: people living in a big city are more likely to be open minded about dif-
ferent cultures, which are less perceived as a threat. In addition, poor immigrants, especially
from different etnicity, cannot afford to live in a big city, preferring less expensive houses in
suburbs, small cities or country villages. For this reason, and for the closeness to manufacturing
industries, these three types of locations experienced an increase in the share of foreign resi-
dents. This fact lead to a particular sensitivity about all the themes related to immigrants. This
is confirmed by the significance of anti-immigration variables studied in the "cultural values"
class of coefficients.
With respect of all the considerations above, we can argue that countrysides are less affected
by these phenomena, due to the reduced job opportunities offered to its residents. Moreover,
immigrants rely heavily on the social and familar net with their peers. So, where they come to
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settle down, they often try to build communities of same ethnic group. This fact makes homes
in countryside less attractive to immigrants.
The analysis about market labor variables highlight that people with a high grade of economic
insecurity are more likely to feel close to populist parties, as well as inactive respondents (peo-
ple unemployed but not actively looking for a job), respondents who experienced an extended
period of time as unemployed (three or more months) and people that feel difficult to live with
their present income. Conversely, employed and retired people, as well as students are less
likely to fell close to such parties.
As we stated during the analysis of domicile, the effect of variables regarding anti-immigrant
aptitudes is positive, large and significant. Similar considerations can be made about mistrust in
politicians and the grade of satisfaction about how democracy works in the respondent’s coun-
try. Another positive and significant variable is the one measuring the level of security perceived
by the respondents; we expected this kind of effect, since the theme of security is one of the
main themes on the populist agenda.
3.1.2 Vote for populist party
The correlation between closeness to and vote for a populist party is really high (0.793): the
results reflect this correlation, and are very similar to the ones presented in Subsection 3.1.1.
The effect of gender and education remains stable, while the linear effect of age is never signif-
icant. Conversely, the quadratic part of this effect remains negative and significant.
All the considerations about how the domicile of the respondents affect the probability to feel
close to a populist party hold in this analysis, for the probability of voting for such parties.
About market labor, we are in the same situation, except for the variable "retired", which lose
its significance in this analysis.
Also with regard to attitudinal variables, there are no significant variations between this model
and the previous one.3.2.1
3.1.3 Indexes for closeness to populist ideology
The indexes considered in this Subsection are based on a set of variables which are considered
by the existing literature good drivers of populism ideology. This entails that almost all apti-
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tudinal and cultural values variables used in Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 are not present in the
models considered, since they are used to build the indexes.
As already described in Section 2.2, we created two indexes, a simple one and a stricter one: in
this Subsection the results obtained from both indexes are highlighted and compared.










Age 0.00285*** 0.00278*** 0.00124*** 0.00161***
(0.000239) (0.000240) (0.000311) (0.000312)
Age2 -2.87e-05*** -2.80e-05*** -1.36e-05*** -1.79e-05***
(2.34e-06) (2.34e-06) (3.12e-06) (3.15e-06)
Education (years) -0.00735*** -0.00714*** -0.00537*** -0.00502***
(0.000209) (0.000213) (0.000237) (0.000238)
Sex(male) 0.00109 0.00101 0.00415** 0.0118***
(0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00172) (0.00175)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00529* 0.00699** 0.00864***
Suburbs (0.00294) (0.00309) (0.00308)
Domicile = 3, 0.00893*** 0.00921*** 0.0118***
Small city (0.00247) (0.00261) (0.00261)
Domicile = 4, 0.0166*** 0.0187*** 0.0249***
Country village (0.00251) (0.00266) (0.00267)
Domicile = 5, 0.00313 0.00626* 0.0124***
Home in countryside (0.00357) (0.00374) (0.00374)
Market Labor












Unemployed, actively -0.00149 0.00102
looking for job (0.00525) (0.00523)
unemployed, NOT -0.00771 -0.00670
actively looking for job (0.00715) (0.00714)
Retired -0.00936*** -0.00895**
(0.00359) (0.00359)





Constant 0.104*** 0.0920*** 0.125*** 0.0932***
(0.00715) (0.00743) (0.00982) (0.00993)
Observations 108,404 108,291 90,412 89,975
R-squared 0.048 0.049 0.057 0.063
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.2: 2nd Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy
Regarding the demographic variables, the linear part of the age effect remains positive and
significant across the nested models, while the quadratic one remains negative and significant.
The overall effect depends on the age of the respondent: considering model (4), the effect of
age is a concave parabola with vertex (and maximum) in around 45 years. Therefore, a 45 years
old respondent will have the maximum probability (due to age effect) to be close to populist
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ideology. Recalling the example in Subsection 3.1.1, a 20 years old now has -0.8% probability
to be close to populist ideology than a 60 years old, and -1.2% probability with respect to a 45
years old person.
The effects of education and gender remain the same as in Subsection 3.1.1.
The effect of domicile retains a similar pattern as presented in the last Subsections, with some
exceptions: the category "Home in countryside" gains significance throughout the models, be-
coming highly significant in model (4). This phenomenon become evident after the addition of
the only aptitudinal variable not used to build the indexes, which is the need of security per-
ceived.
About the market labor variables, the effect are very similar to what we presented in the close-
ness to populist parties model, and we expected this kind of results.
Given the significance gained by the different categories of the variable "domicile", the com-
parison between the two distinct models for urban and rural residents gains value too. Figure
3.1 displays the visual difference in coefficients of these two models, showing the overlapping
confidence intervals for each couple of coefficients (regarding the same variable).
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Figure 3.1: Comparison between the coefficients of rural and urban models. dom_c refers to
rural model, dom_u refers to the urban one
As already appointed in this Subsection, the further a person live from a big city, the greater
the probability to be close to populist ideology. This phenomenon can be observed even in Fig-
ure 3.1, which shows an increase in the effect of the gender and low income perceived. These
coefficients are significantly higher in the rural model than in the urban counterparts.
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3.2 Far right parties
3.2.1 Closeness to far right party
(1) (2) (3) (4)









Age -0.000174 -0.000338 -0.00148*** -0.000459
(0.000231) (0.000232) (0.000309) (0.000323)
Age2 -8.59e-06*** -7.02e-06*** 2.56e-06 -9.37e-06***
(2.26e-06) (2.27e-06) (3.11e-06) (3.28e-06)
Education (years) -0.00664*** -0.00626*** -0.00563*** -0.00292***
(0.000202) (0.000206) (0.000236) (0.000248)
Sex(male) 0.0182*** 0.0179*** 0.0210*** 0.0183***
(0.00155) (0.00155) (0.00171) (0.00179)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00999*** 0.0108*** 0.00726**
Suburbs (0.00285) (0.00307) (0.00312)
Domicile = 3, 0.0124*** 0.0127*** 0.00834***
Small city (0.00239) (0.00260) (0.00265)
Domicile = 4, 0.0240*** 0.0249*** 0.0158***
Country village (0.00242) (0.00265) (0.00273)
Domicile = 5, 0.0213*** 0.0209*** 0.0125***
Home in countryside (0.00345) (0.00372) (0.00382)
Market Labor












Unemployed, actively -0.0160*** -0.0121**
looking for job (0.00522) (0.00535)
Unemployed, NOT -0.00645 -0.00443
actively looking for job (0.00711) (0.00726)
Retired -0.00742** -0.00840**
(0.00357) (0.00371)













Immigr is bad for economy 0.0219***
(0.00233)
Anti-immigr same race -0.0105***
(0.00273)
Anti-immigr diff race 0.0285***
(0.00293)




Constant 0.115*** 0.0977*** 0.127*** 0.00997
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(0.00691) (0.00718) (0.00977) (0.0103)
Observations 108,404 108,291 90,412 81,027
R-squared 0.240 0.241 0.220 0.253
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: Closeness to Far-right party, OLS regression country dummy
The overall effect of age remains significant through the nested models; sometimes the preva-
lent part of the effect is linear, sometimes the quadratic part lead the effect. Both have a negative
effect on the probability to feel close to far right parties, which means that the probability to
feel close to such parties is higher at a young age.
As we expect from literature, the years of educations (completed) has a negative effect on this
probability, whereas male respondents are more likely to feel close to this category of parties
than female ones.
Regarding the domicile of the respondents, its effects and significance remain stable in all the
models considered. As like populism analysis 3.1.1 an underlyng pattern can be found: as we
move away from the big cities, the probability to feel close to far right parties increases.
The effect of this variable is complex, and related to other variables included in the some of
the models considered: as we can see, between model (3) and (4) part of the effect is absorbed
by market labor first and aptitudinal and cultural values variables later. We notice that the bigger
effect is in "Country village".
A possible explanation of this phenomenon could be the following: people living in a big city
are more likely to be open-minded towards different cultures and different ways of living (such
as homosexuality).
In addition, as discussed extensively in the previous section, poor immigrants, especially those
of different ethnicity than native residents, cannot afford to live in a big city, preferring cheaper
houses in the suburbs, small towns or country villages. For this reason, and because of their
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proximity to manufacturing industries, these three types of locations have seen an increase in
the share of foreign residents. This fact has led to a particular sensitivity on all issues related to
immigrants. This is confirmed by the relevance of the anti-immigration variables studied in the
class of "cultural values" coefficients that in this section also take into account the distinctions
between types of immigrants and their effect (perceived by residents) on the culture and econ-
omy of the country of arrival.
The analysis of labour market variables shows that people with a high degree of economic
insecurity (e.g.: people struggling to make ends meet) are more likely to feel close to extreme
right-wing parties, as are those interviewed who have experienced a long period of time as un-
employed (three months or more) during their lives. On the contrary, the employed, unemployed
(actively looking for a job) and retired people, as well as students, are less likely to approach
such parties.
Let us now explore the effects of attitudinal and cultural values variables.
The issue of security is an evergreen on the agenda of far-right parties (as it is in many far-right
populist parties). As we expected, the variable that measures "the level of security perceived by
respondents" is significant and positive, confirming that not feeling safe to go out after dark in
one’s own neighborhood can lead one to associate with a party that makes increased security a
pivotal point.
Another issue that is very much present in the rhetoric of extreme right-wing parties is im-
migration. In this model we test the effect of six anti-immigration variables. The analyses show
that all the anti-immigration measures are significant, all but one have a positive effect on the
probability of voting for a far-right party. The variable with a negative effect is the one that
attests the intention not to accept migrants even if they are of the same ethnic group, which is
generally not consistent with far-right rhetoric. In fact, far-right parties emphasize how immi-
grants, especially those from poor countries, "steal work" from the indigenous population, do
not fit into our "host country" culture and are a threat to the cultural values of these "host coun-
tries". Conversely, this rhetoric is not applied between countries that share the same ethnicity,
such as Belgium and France or Denmark and Sweden.
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All the variables of opinion analysed are significant and have a positive effect on the proba-
bility of feeling close to an extreme right-wing party. Among them we find: the variable for
control over homophobia, which is based on the question "Gay men and lesbians should be free
to live their own life as they wish", which is very significant but whose effect is not very strong.
On the other hand, the variable in which is recorded if the respondent is positioned to the right
or left of the political spectrum is not only very significant but its effect is huge, +8.3%. Last
but not least we have the control for "a more authoritarian government" which is significant and
with a positive effect in the closeness to an extreme right party.
3.2.2 Vote for far right party
The correlation between closeness to and vote for a far right party is really high (0.830): the
results reflect this correlation, and are very similar to the ones presented in Subsection 3.2.1.
The effect of gender and education remains stable as in the last model 3.2.1. The overall effect
of age remains significant through the nested models; sometimes the prevalent part of the effect
is linear, sometimes the quadratic part lead the effect. Both have a negative effect on the prob-
ability to feel close to far right parties, which means that the probability to feel close to such
parties is higher at a young age.
All the considerations on how the domicile of respondents affects the probability of voting
for an extreme right-wing party remain unchanged. The same applies to the significance and
effect of these variables reported in the analyses that can be consulted in the appendix.
As far as work on the market is concerned, we are in the same situation, except for a small
variation in the magnitude of the effects.
As we expected, given the very high correlation between the variable "feeling close to an ex-
treme right-wing political party" and "I voted for an extreme right-wing party in the last elec-
tions". The situation with regard to the attitudinal variables and variables associated with cul-
tural values also remains unchanged compared to the previous section.
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3.2.3 Indexes for closeness to far right ideology
The indexes considered in this Subsection are based on a set of variables which are considered
by the existing literature good drivers of far right ideology. This entails that almost all apti-
tudinal and cultural values variables used in Subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 are not present in the
models considered, since most of them are used to build the indexes.
As already described in Section 2.2, we created two indexes, a simple one and a stricter one: in












Age -9.79e-05 -0.000291 -0.00176***
(0.000275) (0.000276) (0.000362)
Age2 1.42e-05*** 1.61e-05*** 2.62e-05***
(2.69e-06) (2.70e-06) (3.65e-06)
Education (years) -0.00876*** -0.00835*** -0.00746***
(0.000241) (0.000245) (0.000276)
Sex(male) 0.00954*** 0.00915*** 0.0130***
(0.00184) (0.00184) (0.00199)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, -0.00203 0.000654
Suburbs (0.00338) (0.00358)
Domicile = 3, 0.00553* 0.00829***
Small city (0.00283) (0.00303)
Domicile = 4, 0.0185*** 0.0214***
Country village (0.00288) (0.00310)
Domicile = 5, 0.0278*** 0.0306***
Home in countryside (0.00410) (0.00435)
Market Labor
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looking for job (0.00610)
Unemployed, NOT -0.0102
actively looking for job (0.00832)
Retired 0.00394
(0.00419)
Unemployed (3 months+) -0.0113***
(0.00243)
Constant 0.127*** 0.116*** 0.175***
(0.00820) (0.00853) (0.0114)
Observations 107,027 106,917 89,485
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.070
Country dummy YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: 2nd Index of closeness to Far-right party, OLS regression country dummy
As regards demographic variables, the linear part of the age effect becomes significant, with
negative effect, only in the last model while the quadratic part remains positive and significant
in all models. Let’s proceed with an easy example to understand how the effect applies to real-
ity. Taking for example the model (3) the difference in probability, to feel close to the extreme
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right ideology, between a 20-year-old and a 60-year-old is equal to +1.35%; therefore the linear
part of the age effect takes the lead.
The effects of education and gender remain the same as in Subsection 3.2.1.
The effect of domicile maintains a trend similar to that presented in the last subsections 3.2.1
3.2.2 , the further you move away from the city the more likely you are to feel close to extreme
right-wing ideologies but with one exception: the "Suburbs" category is never statistically dif-
ferent from baseline (big city).
As we also expected for labour market variables, the effect is very similar to what we presented
in previous models.
Given the significance gained by the different categories of the variable "domicile", the com-
parison between the two distinct models for urban and rural residents gains value too. Figure
3.2 displays the visual difference in coefficients of these two models, showing the overlapping
confidence intervals for each couple of coefficients (regarding the same variable).
Figure 3.2: Comparison between the coefficients of rural and urban models. dom_c refers to
rural model, dom_u refers to the urban one
As already appointed in this Subsection, the further a person live from a big city, the greater
the probability to be close to far right ideology. This phenomenon can be observed even in
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Figure 3.1, which shows an increase in the effect of the gender, low income perceived and
employed. These coefficients are significantly higher in the rural model than in the urban coun-
terparts.
3.3 Eurosceptic parties
3.3.1 Closeness to eurosceptic party














Age -0.000350 -0.000527 -0.000663 -0.00147***
(0.000332) (0.000333) (0.000447) (0.000538)
Age2 -9.40e-06*** -7.73e-06** -6.74e-06 -2.95e-07
(3.25e-06) (3.26e-06) (4.50e-06) (5.44e-06)
Education (years) -0.00485*** -0.00444*** -0.00327*** -0.00214***
(0.000291) (0.000296) (0.000342) (0.000399)
Sex(male) 0.0183*** 0.0179*** 0.0191*** 0.0164***
(0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00247) (0.00290)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00157 0.00159 -0.00284
Suburbs (0.00409) (0.00444) (0.00520)
Domicile = 3, 0.00924*** 0.00995*** 0.00532
Small city (0.00343) (0.00376) (0.00437)
Domicile = 4, 0.0180*** 0.0214*** 0.0133***
Country village (0.00348) (0.00383) (0.00449)
Domicile = 5, 0.0339*** 0.0364*** 0.0207***
Home in countryside (0.00496) (0.00538) (0.00635)
Market Labor












Unemployed, actively 0.0107 0.00642
looking for job (0.00755) (0.00880)
Unemployed, NOT 0.0397*** 0.0309**
actively looking for job (0.0103) (0.0123)
Retired 0.00199 0.00109
(0.00517) (0.00621)
Unemployed (3 months+) 0.0241*** 0.0210***
(0.00301) (0.00351)
Cultural values
EU gone too far 0.0991***
(0.00343)
Mistrust in EU parliament 0.0897***
(0.00337)
Constant 0.0968*** 0.0835*** 0.0806*** 0.0474***
(0.00993) (0.0103) (0.0141) (0.0166)
Observations 108,404 108,291 90,412 64,359
R-squared 0.143 0.143 0.142 0.159
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: Closeness to Eusceptic party, OLS regression country dummy
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The overall effect of age remains significant through the nested models; in the first two models
the prevalent part of the effect is quadratic, in the second one, model 3 and model 4, the linear
part of the effect take the lead. Both have a negative effect on the probability to feel close to
eurosceptic parties, which means that the probability to feel close to such parties is higher at a
young age.
This goes against our expectations because the young Europeans, "the Erasmus generation", are
the ones who have the most chance of obtaining benefits and opportunities from the European
Union.
Although given the high correlation that there is between the three variables of closeness to the
parties, it could happen.(see Table2.8)
I would like to remind you that the same party often "turns on" more than one categorical indi-
cator, in fact, out of 49 parties analyzed across Europe, 45 are Eurosceptic but only 18 of them
are purely Eurosceptic (and not even populist and/or extreme right wing).
I would like to say that, today, many populist and far-right parties declare themselves Euroscep-
tic just for convenience. In their narrative, the European Union is an enemy to fight and the
cause of many economic and social evils. These parties create slogans like: "Immigrants? It’s
Europe’s fault, we don’t want them" or "The economy’s going badly! It’s all the fault of the
euro" etc. Unfortunately, the lack of variables of opinion about this theme makes the analysis
of Euroscepticism less stringent than the previous ones.
As we expect, the years of educations completed has a negative effect on this probability,
whereas male respondents are more likely to feel close to this category of parties than female
ones.
The effect of domicile maintains a trend similar to that presented in 3.2.3, the further you move
away from the city the more likely you are to feel close to eurosceptic ideologies but with
one exception, the "Suburbs" category is never statistically different from baseline (big city).
Moreover, the effect of this variable is further reduced after the introduction of the attitudinal
variables about Europe.
The analysis of labour market variables shows that people with a high degree of economic
insecurity(low income perceived) are more likely to feel close to eurosceptic parties, as are
those interviewed who have experienced a long period of time as unemployed (three months or
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more) during their lives or are unemployed but not actively looking for a job. On the contrary,
the employed with an indefinitive contract, as well as students, are less likely to approach such
parties.
The attitudinal variables in this model are two. The first one measure mistrust in the Euro-
pean Union as a governmental entity using the next question as a proxy “and their opinion on
the process of European integration "on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each
of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you
have complete trust. Firstly... ...the European Parliament?". The second helps us to understand
whether they think that the process of European integration should continue or whether they
regret it. Both variables are positive and important effect,between 9/10%, on the probability of
feeling close to a Eurosceptic party.
3.3.2 Vote to eurosceptic party
The correlation between closeness to and vote for a eurosceptic party is high (0.79), results
reflect this correlation, and are very similar to the ones presented in Subsection 3.3.1.
All the considerations on how the domicile of respondents affects the probability of voting for
an eurosceptic party remain unchanged. The same applies to the significance and effect of these
variables. The results of the analysis are given in the appendix.A.24
As far as labour market variables are concerned, we note that in the model (3) both unemployed
people actively seeking work and those not actively seeking work are more likely to vote for
a Eurosceptic party. This effect remains only until the introduction of the attitudinal variables
on Europe that absorb the effect that was previously captured by these variables. Other vari-
ables remain significant in all models as drivers for Eurosceptic voting: - having experienced
unemployment for more than 3 consecutive months. - Being retired - and have a low income
(perceived) Conversely, if you are a student you are less likely to vote for a Eurosceptic party
and the significance of this variable increases with the introduction of the variables about Eu-
rope.
The effect of attitudinal variables on voting is significant and positive but the magnitude of the
effect is smaller than in the previous model 3.3.1.
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3.3.3 Indexes for closeness to eurosceptic ideology
The indices considered in this subsection are based on two proxies on the fiducian towards
Europe and the European integration process. Although they are only two questions they are
extremely precise and consistent with our hypothesis of affiliation to a Europeanist ideology.
As already described in Section 2.2, we created two indexes, a simple one and a stricter one: in
this Subsection the results obtained from both indexes are highlighted and compared.
(1) (2) (3)







Age 0.00646*** 0.00621*** 0.00570***
(0.000347) (0.000347) (0.000460)
Age2 -5.37e-05*** -5.14e-05*** -4.80e-05***
(3.40e-06) (3.41e-06) (4.64e-06)
Education (years) -0.00901*** -0.00848*** -0.00645***
(0.000301) (0.000306) (0.000348)
Sex(male) 0.0238*** 0.0233*** 0.0295***
(0.00231) (0.00231) (0.00252)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00205 0.00836*
Suburbs (0.00422) (0.00453)
Domicile = 3, 0.0147*** 0.0183***
Small city (0.00354) (0.00383)
Domicile = 4, 0.0242*** 0.0301***
Country village (0.00360) (0.00391)
Domicile = 5, 0.0433*** 0.0494***
Home in countryside (0.00513) (0.00550)
Market Labor













looking for job (0.00770)
Unemployed, NOT 0.0130
actively looking for job (0.0105)
Retired -0.00351
(0.00532)
Unemployed (3 months+) 0.0134***
(0.00307)
Constant 0.145*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0145)
Observations 104,510 104,411 87,808
R-squared 0.057 0.058 0.064
Country dummy YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: 2nd Index of closeness to Eusceptic party, OLS regression country dummy
Regarding the demographic variables, the linear part of the age effect remains positive and
significant across the nested models, while the quadratic one remains negative and significant.
The overall effect depends on the age of the respondent: considering model (4), the effect of
age is a concave parabola with vertex (and maximum) in around 59 years. Therefore, a 59 years
old respondent will have the maximum probability (due to age effect) to be close to eurosceptic
ideology. Recalling the example in Subsection3.3.1, a 20 years old now has -7.4% probability
to be close to eurosceptic ideology than a 60 years old.
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The effects of education and gender remain the same as in Subsection "feel close to eurosceptic
parties" 3.3.1.
The effect of domicile retains a similar pattern as presented in the last Subsections, with some
exceptions: the category "Suburbs" gains significance throughout the models, becoming signif-
icant in model (2) and (3).
About the market labor variables, the effect are very similar to what we presented in the close-
ness to eurosceptic parties model, and we expected this kind of results
Given the significance gained by the different categories of the variable "domicile", the com-
parison between the two distinct models for urban and rural residents gains value too. Figure
3.3 displays the visual difference in coefficients of these two models, from 2nd strict index of
closeness to eusceptic ideology, showing the overlapping confidence intervals for each couple
of coefficients (regarding the same variable).
Figure 3.3: Comparison between the coefficients of rural and urban models. dom_c refers to
rural model, dom_u refers to the urban one
As already appointed in this Subsection, the further a person live from a big city, the greater
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the probability to be close to eurosceptic ideology. This phenomenon can be observed even in
Figure 3.3, which shows an increase in the effect of the gender. These coefficients are signifi-
cantly higher in the rural model than in the urban counterpart.
3.4 Control variables
In all the models carried out we always checked for the effect of the data collection round and
the country where the individuals observed were interviewed. In addition, in all models that
included labour market variables, a check for the declared income class was added. In the
next tables we will investigate the effects of these variables in the regression for the feeling
of closeness to the parties. For a better understanding of the phenomenon we have decided to
produce three separate tables; the data refer to the models (4) in closeness to Populist party 3.1,
closeness to Far-right party 3.3, closeness to Eurosceptic party 3.5.
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(1) (2) (3)
Variables Close to Close to Close to
populist party far right party eurosceptic party
2.Switzerland 0.246*** 0.189*** 0.183***
(0.00591) (0.00457) (0.00772)
3.Germany 0.125*** 0.00848** 0.111***
(0.00547) (0.00426) (0.00692)
4.Spain -0.00981* -0.0333*** 0.0601***
(0.00596) (0.00472) (0.00769)
5.Finland 0.0440*** 0.0179*** 0.0987***
(0.00547) (0.00435) (0.00714)
6.France 0.0311*** 0.0414*** 0.103***
(0.00566) (0.00453) (0.00730)
7.United -0.0126** -0.00756* 0.326***
Kingdom (0.00574) (0.00449) (0.00758)
8.Hungary 0.580*** 0.559*** 0.590***
(0.00738) (0.00627) (0.00983)
9.Ireland 0.0975*** -0.0285*** 0.106***
(0.00649) (0.00533) (0.00841)
10.Netherlands 0.189*** 0.0531*** 0.177***
(0.00559) (0.00433) (0.00728)
11.Norway 0.141*** 0.129*** 0.352***
(0.00556) (0.00431) (0.00737)
12.Poland 0.345*** 0.283*** 0.387***
(0.00762) (0.00595) (0.0100)
13.Portugal -0.0839*** -0.0558*** 0.0915***
(0.00723) (0.00558) (0.00908)
14.Sweden 0.0700*** 0.0637*** 0.0807***
(0.00550) (0.00431) (0.00716)
15.Slovenia 0.0134* -0.0364*** 0.0566***
(0.00754) (0.00594) (0.00982)
Constant 0.0154 0.00997 0.0474***
(0.0129) (0.0103) (0.0166)
Observations 76,017 81,027 64,359
R-squared 0.199 0.253 0.159
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: Country dummy in closeness to populist/far right/eurosceptic parties72
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The country chosen as the baseline was Belgium. The most important effects were those
for Hungary, Switzerland, Poland. Hungary and Poland in particular have experienced a huge
increase in voting for these types of parties.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Close to Close to Close to
populist party far right party eurosceptic party
1.income 0.00299 -0.0127*** -0.000929
(0.00573) (0.00462) (0.00772)
2.income 0.0146*** 0.000418 0.00591
(0.00521) (0.00417) (0.00692)
3.income 0.00402 -0.000359 0.00750
(0.00479) (0.00377) (0.00630)
4.income -0.00501 -0.00459 1.47e-05
(0.00462) (0.00361) (0.00604)
6.income -0.0129*** -0.00699* -0.0100
(0.00468) (0.00366) (0.00612)
7.income -0.00871* -0.00506 -0.0147**
(0.00466) (0.00366) (0.00609)
8.income -0.0124*** -0.00855** -0.0149**
(0.00451) (0.00350) (0.00586)
9.income -0.0218*** -0.0229*** -0.0317***
(0.00488) (0.00385) (0.00637)
10.income -0.0377*** -0.0366*** -0.0490***
(0.00507) (0.00405) (0.00665)
Constant 0.0124 0.0227** 0.0483***
(0.0125) (0.00999) (0.0160)
Observations 76,017 81,027 64,359
R-squared 0.199 0.253 0.159
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Classes of income dummy in closeness to populist/far right/eurosceptic parties
The income class chosen as the baseline was the fifth. From the above table we note that
high income classes significantly decrease the probability of feeling close to the three types of
parties taken in exam. On the contrary, this does not happen for the income classes lower than
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the median income class (used as a baseline) which are not significant.
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Close to Close to Close to
populist party far right party eurosceptic party
2.wave 0.0204*** -0.00324 -0.00496
(0.00458) (0.00358) (0.00537)
3.wave 0.0177*** -0.0160*** -0.00546
(0.00416) (0.00365) (0.00514)
4.wave 0.0145*** 0.00564 0.00504
(0.00411) (0.00360) (0.00509)
5.wave 0.00556 0.00312 0.00704
(0.00430) (0.00374) (0.00617)
6.wave 0.0265*** 0.0120*** 0.0121**
(0.00408) (0.00355) (0.00504)
7.wave 0.0646*** 0.0395*** 0.0558***
(0.00407) (0.00356) (0.00502)
8.wave 0.0735*** 0.0526*** 0.0655***
(0.00413) (0.00360) (0.00509)
Constant 0.0154 0.00997 0.0474***
(0.0129) (0.0103) (0.0166)
Observations 76,017 81,027 64,359
R-squared 0.199 0.253 0.159
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: wave dummy in closeness to populist/far right/eurosceptic parties
As you can see from the table 3.9 all the most recent waves are significant and with a
positive effect on the feeling of closeness to the three types of parties considered. This is also
demonstrated by the fact that the vote for these parties has more than quadrupled in the last
twenty years.
The fact that control variables like wave dummy, country dummy and income classes dummy
are significant makes us understand that there are factors that influence these variables that are
not explicitly contained in our models.
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Conclusion
The vote for a party, like the closeness to it, is not only a function of measurable objective vari-
ables (e.g. unemployment, type of employment contract, etc.) but is also part of the cultural
values of the individual and the community to which it belongs.
Some of these influences are unfortunately not measurable through the data provided by ESS.
Because of this lack of information we find some discrepancies between the results of the in-
fluence of the variables studied on the "vote, proximity to the parties examined" and the results
obtained "from indices constructed for proximity to ideology". Populist rhetoric is not only
based on proposing temporary solutions without taking into account long-term costs, "simplis-
tic" remedies to complex problems, and the opposition between Plebs and Elite, but also on
other elements which cannot be investigated with the data taken in exam, such as the role of the
figure of the "charismatic leader", very present in extreme right-wing parties, on the aggressive
propaganda that all too often resorts to "fake news".
As regard the factors that relate on proposing temporary solutions without taking into account
long-term costs, "simplistic" remedies to complex problems and the opposition between Plebs
and Elite we were able to report their effects. For example, a certain level of education allows
individuals to recognize these "easy solutions" and "temporary remedies" that involve very high
costs for the population in the medium to long term. In fact, education has proved to be signifi-
cant and always with a negative effect in each model examined.
The results about the effect of gender on the vote for populist and/or far-right parties reflect
what was expected and demonstrated in literature. Empirical studies have shown that far-right
populist parties receive more votes from men than from women than traditional parties. Accord-
ing to the authors the main motivation derives from the fact that men and women cover different
socio-economic positions, in fact women are more likely to be employed in the public sector,
therefore less likely to be employed in labour-intensive jobs (such as factory work) and there-
fore less likely to be threatened by deindustrialization. This also leads to a lower perception of
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the threat from immigrants. This difference makes it less likely that women feel close to pop-
ulist radical right-wing parties.(harteveld,2015)[10](immerzeel,2015)[12](spierings,2015)[31]
In addition, there are also theoretical reasons to expect women to be more motivated to con-
trol prejudice than men. Women have been argued to place a greater importance on interper-
sonal relations and generally score higher on empathy.(Harteveld,2015)[10](Pratto,1997)[26]
It is therefore reasonable to expect a stronger focus on interpersonal relations to be associated
with a greater commitment to the goal of acting without prejudice toward others. And also for
the latter reasoning we think it reasonable that women are on average less likely to feel close to
parties that attack weaker sections of society and propose inhumane solutions (e.g. think of the
humanitarian consequences caused by the "closed ports" policy in Italy and the related cases of
the ship "Diciotti" in June 2018 and the ship "Gregoretti" in July 2019).
Another aspect that we investigated extensively was the effect of the area of residence of the
respondents; the effect of this variable is complex and related to other variables included in
some of the models considered. Basically, as we move away from the big cities, the probability
to feel close to the three categories of parties taken in exam increases. A possible explanation
of this phenomenon could be that people living in a big city are more likely to be open minded
towards different cultures, which are less perceived as a threat. In addition, poor immigrants,
especially from different ethnicity, cannot afford to live in a big city, preferring less expensive
houses in suburbs, small cities or country villages. For this reason, and for the closeness to
manufacturing industries, these locations have experienced an increase in the share of foreign
residents. This fact leads to an increase in negative attitude regarding all the immigrants-related
themes. Immigration is in fact one of the main issues used by these types of parties. This
is confirmed by the results of anti-immigration variables studied in the "cultural values" class
across the models. With respect to all the considerations above, we can argue that rural areas are
less affected by these phenomena, due to the reduced job opportunities offered to its residents.
Moreover, immigrants heavily rely on the social and familiar net with their peers. So, when
they come to settle down, they often try to build communities of individuals belonging to the
same ethnic group. For this reason big cities and sometimes countryside are less attractive to
immigrants. In addition, there is a certain degree of anomie in cities, as cultural clashes between
native and foreign communities are less frequent. Conversely, in smaller communities, which
are generally more cohesive, less accustomed to the new and whose residents on average are
less open-minded than residents of large cities, the arrival of these foreigners inevitably causes
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Conclusion
a certain degree of conflict. Unfortunately, it is this mentality also creates economic damage,
as immigration has been shown to offer much to both cities and rural areas.(Dustmann,2007)[6]
Just think of the cost in human capital of caring for people who are not completely autonomous
(the elderly, children), thanks to immigration you have access to a service at a lower cost than
before the arrival of migrants, and this allows you to employ all the active members of the fam-
ily in work instead of having to sacrifice one to play the role of nanny/caregiver. Ultimately, in
our analyses we have found confirmation that distrust of national and supranational institutions
are associated with an increase in the possibility of joining Populist and/or Eurosceptic parties.
With this data is not possible to investigate the relationship between the role of the figure of
the "charismatic leader", the presence of "fake news" within the political discourse, the incon-
sistency due to the continuous variations in the positions expressed by the party, which vary
according to the "hot" topics of the moment and the vote for/closeness to the three categories of
parties taken in exam . But the fact that control variables like wave dummy, country dummy and
income classes dummy are significant makes us understand that there are factors that influence
these variables that are not explicitly contained in our models. In conclusion it would be very
interesting to try to expand this study by integrating it with particular datasets that allow us to






















Indefinite contract 0.00369 0.00628
(0.00556) (0.00403)




Unemployed, actively -0.00875 -0.00385
looking for job (0.0113) (0.00830)
Unemployed, NOT 0.0156 0.0152
actively looking for job (0.0159) (0.0114)
Retired -0.0153* -0.00788
(0.00844) (0.00569)





Mistrust in politicians 0.0303*** 0.0501***
(0.00687) (0.00486)
Mistrust in political parties 0.00341 -0.00612
(0.00696) (0.00493)
Unsatisfied of democracy 0.0466*** 0.0526***
(0.00494) (0.00344)
Anti Poor Immigrant 0.0361*** 0.0419***
(0.00451) (0.00308)
Anti-immigr culture 0.0656*** 0.0557***
(0.00576) (0.00368)
Immigr is bad for economy 0.0291*** 0.0324***
(0.00515) (0.00339)






Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.1: Closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS
regression country dummy
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Age 9.30e-05 2.65e-05 0.000152 4.29e-05 0.000193











(2.53e-06) (2.54e-06) (3.31e-06) (3.48e-06) (3.68e-06)
Education (years) -0.00660*** -0.00641*** -0.00472*** -0.00270*** -0.00279***
(0.000211) (0.000215) (0.000250) (0.000260) (0.000275)
Sex(male) 0.0222*** 0.0222*** 0.0262*** 0.0273*** 0.0292***
(0.00157) (0.00157) (0.00175) (0.00183) (0.00194)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00674** 0.00860*** 0.00518 0.00611*
Suburbs (0.00294) (0.00321) (0.00327) (0.00348)
Domicile = 3, 0.00670*** 0.00649** 0.00243 0.00546*
Small city (0.00246) (0.00271) (0.00276) (0.00292)
Domicile = 4, 0.0147*** 0.0152*** 0.00966*** 0.0117***
Country village (0.00249) (0.00275) (0.00283) (0.00299)
Domicile = 5, Home 0.000524 0.000968 -0.00321 0.000106
in countryside (0.00350) (0.00382) (0.00391) (0.00412)
Market Labor
Low income 0.0248*** 0.0133*** 0.0133***
(perceived) (0.00268) (0.00279) (0.00295)
Employed -0.00892*** -0.00708** -0.00819**
(0.00339) (0.00346) (0.00369)
Indefinite contract -0.00185 0.000471 0.00387
(0.00259) (0.00262) (0.00278)
Being richer -0.0191** -0.0155* -0.0192*
(0.00903) (0.00917) (0.00990)




Unemployed, actively 0.00594 0.00572 0.00628
looking for job (0.00550) (0.00561) (0.00593)
Unemployed, NOT 0.0146** 0.0124* 0.0121
actively looking for job (0.00730) (0.00747) (0.00797)
retired 0.000597 -0.000359 0.000961
(0.00365) (0.00379) (0.00404)
Unemployed 0.0188*** 0.0176*** 0.0188***
(3 months+) (0.00212) (0.00216) (0.00229)
Cultural values
Mistrust in politicians 0.0303*** 0.0336***
(0.00227) (0.00343)
Mistrust in political -0.00646*
parties (0.00345)
Unsatisfied of 0.0377*** 0.0365***
democracy (0.00220) (0.00236)
Anti Poor Immigrant 0.0306*** 0.0307***
(0.00203) (0.00216)
Anti-immigr culture 0.0433*** 0.0425***
(0.00248) (0.00262)
Immigr is bad 0.0220*** 0.0250***
for economy (0.00224) (0.00239)
Feeling unsafe 0.00586** 0.00527**
(0.00247) (0.00264)
Constant 0.125*** 0.115*** 0.101*** 0.0246** 0.0336***
(0.00792) (0.00817) (0.0105) (0.0110) (0.0116)
Observations 142,774 142,622 119,364 112,392 99,946
R-squared 0.239 0.239 0.199 0.205 0.220
Country dummy YES YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.2: Vote for Populist party in last election, comparison between urban and rural domi-
cile, OLS regression country dummy
(1) (2)















Indefinite contract 0.00468 0.00395
(0.00486) (0.00337)




Unemployed, actively 0.00303 0.00821
looking for job (0.0105) (0.00716)
Unemployed, NOT 0.00199 0.0172*
actively looking for job (0.0141) (0.00964)
Retired -0.00917 0.00498
(0.00744) (0.00480)





Mistrust in politicians 0.0287*** 0.0358***
(0.00612) (0.00414)
Mistrust in political parties -0.00479 -0.00746*
(0.00615) (0.00416)
Unsatisfied of democracy 0.0408*** 0.0349***
(0.00426) (0.00283)
Anti Poor Immigrant 0.0328*** 0.0300***
(0.00393) (0.00259)
Anti-immigr culture 0.0499*** 0.0401***
(0.00499) (0.00309)
Immigr is bad for economy 0.0202*** 0.0270***
(0.00444) (0.00283)






Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.3: Vote for Populist party in last election, comparison between urban and rural domi-
cile, OLS regression country dummy
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Age 0.00525*** 0.00518*** 0.00311*** 0.00340***









(1.80e-06) (1.80e-06) (2.53e-06) (2.55e-06)
Education (years) -0.00893*** -0.00870*** -0.00660*** -0.00618***
(0.000171) (0.000174) (0.000200) (0.000200)
Sex(male) 0.000592 0.000523 0.00351** 0.0122***
(0.00127) (0.00127) (0.00140) (0.00143)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00326 0.00597** 0.00812***
Suburbs (0.00238) (0.00258) (0.00258)
Domicile = 3, 0.0106*** 0.0112*** 0.0143***
Small city (0.00196) (0.00214) (0.00214)
Domicile = 4, 0.0159*** 0.0201*** 0.0275***
Country village (0.00198) (0.00217) (0.00218)
Domicile = 5, 0.0103*** 0.0167*** 0.0236***
Home in countryside (0.00288) (0.00311) (0.00311)
Market Labor




Indefinite contract -0.000459 -0.000446
(0.00207) (0.00207)






Unemployed, actively 0.00289 0.00521
looking for job (0.00395) (0.00394)
Unemployed, NOT -0.00630 -0.00458
actively looking for job (0.00525) (0.00524)
Retired -0.00481 -0.00537*
(0.00297) (0.00297)





Constant 0.0793*** 0.0670*** 0.107*** 0.0732***
(0.00528) (0.00555) (0.00761) (0.00770)
Observations 227,427 227,096 178,781 177,779
R-squared 0.054 0.055 0.065 0.070
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.4: Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy
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(1) (2)


















Indefinite contract -0.00254 -5.20e-05
(0.00345) (0.00255)




Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.00174 0.00727
(0.00663) (0.00486)















Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.5: Index of closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural domicile,
OLS regression country dummy
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Age 0.00266*** 0.00263*** 0.00188*** 0.00205***









(1.17e-06) (1.17e-06) (1.64e-06) (1.66e-06)
Education (years) -0.00390*** -0.00381*** -0.00282*** -0.00261***
(0.000112) (0.000113) (0.000130) (0.000131)
Sex(male) 0.000940 0.000926 0.00300*** 0.00728***
(0.000826) (0.000826) (0.000910) (0.000930)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00208 0.00218 0.00334**
Suburbs (0.00155) (0.00168) (0.00168)
Domicile = 3, 0.00595*** 0.00694*** 0.00846***
Small city (0.00128) (0.00139) (0.00140)
Domicile = 4, 0.00672*** 0.00875*** 0.0124***
Country village (0.00129) (0.00141) (0.00142)
Domicile = 5, 0.00437** 0.00730*** 0.0107***
Home in countryside (0.00187) (0.00202) (0.00203)
Market Labor




Indefinite contract 0.000651 0.000603
(0.00135) (0.00135)






Unemployed, actively -0.00589** -0.00480*
looking for job (0.00257) (0.00257)
Unemployed, NOT 0.000941 0.00172
actively looking for job (0.00342) (0.00342)
Retired -0.00248 -0.00260
(0.00193) (0.00194)





Constant 0.0125*** 0.00677* 0.0227*** 0.00522
(0.00344) (0.00361) (0.00496) (0.00502)
Observations 227,427 227,096 178,781 177,779
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.033 0.036
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.6: Strict Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy
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(1) (2)


















Indefinite contract -0.000307 0.00108
(0.00219) (0.00168)




Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.00322 -0.00567*
(0.00421) (0.00320)















Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.7: Strict Index of closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural
domicile, OLS regression country dummy
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Age 0.00285*** 0.00278*** 0.00124*** 0.00161***









(2.34e-06) (2.34e-06) (3.12e-06) (3.15e-06)
Education (years) -0.00735*** -0.00714*** -0.00537*** -0.00502***
(0.000209) (0.000213) (0.000237) (0.000238)
Sex(male) 0.00109 0.00101 0.00415** 0.0118***
(0.00161) (0.00161) (0.00172) (0.00175)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00529* 0.00699** 0.00864***
Suburbs (0.00294) (0.00309) (0.00308)
Domicile = 3, 0.00893*** 0.00921*** 0.0118***
Small city (0.00247) (0.00261) (0.00261)
Domicile = 4, 0.0166*** 0.0187*** 0.0249***
Country village (0.00251) (0.00266) (0.00267)
Domicile = 5, 0.00313 0.00626* 0.0124***
Home in countryside (0.00357) (0.00374) (0.00374)
Market Labor




Indefinite contract -0.00248 -0.00259
(0.00256) (0.00255)






Unemployed, actively -0.00149 0.00102
looking for job (0.00525) (0.00523)
unemployed, NOT -0.00771 -0.00670
actively looking for job (0.00715) (0.00714)
Retired -0.00936*** -0.00895**
(0.00359) (0.00359)





Constant 0.104*** 0.0920*** 0.125*** 0.0932***
(0.00715) (0.00743) (0.00982) (0.00993)
Observations 108,404 108,291 90,412 89,975
R-squared 0.048 0.049 0.057 0.063
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.8: 2nd Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy
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Indefinite contract -0.00775* -0.000141
(0.00415) (0.00320)




Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.00384 0.00326
(0.00842) (0.00660)















Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.9: 2nd Index of closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural domi-
cile, OLS regression country dummy
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Age 0.00147*** 0.00145*** 0.000931*** 0.00111***









(1.47e-06) (1.48e-06) (1.98e-06) (2.00e-06)
Education (years) -0.00310*** -0.00301*** -0.00217*** -0.00203***
(0.000132) (0.000134) (0.000151) (0.000151)
Sex(male) 0.00124 0.00123 0.00337*** 0.00663***
(0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00109) (0.00111)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00284 0.00177 0.00249
Suburbs (0.00186) (0.00196) (0.00196)
Domicile = 3, 0.00610*** 0.00651*** 0.00764***
Small city (0.00156) (0.00165) (0.00166)
Domicile = 4, 0.00786*** 0.00902*** 0.0118***
Country village (0.00158) (0.00169) (0.00170)
Domicile = 5, 0.00117 0.00142 0.00402*
Home in countryside (0.00225) (0.00237) (0.00238)
Market Labor




Indefinite contract -0.00114 -0.00114
(0.00162) (0.00162)






Unemployed, actively -0.00133 -0.000367
looking for job (0.00332) (0.00332)
Unemployed, NOT 5.08e-06 0.000323
actively looking for job (0.00453) (0.00453)
Retired -0.00124 -0.000959
(0.00228) (0.00228)





Constant 0.0258*** 0.0196*** 0.0299*** 0.0159**
(0.00451) (0.00469) (0.00623) (0.00631)
Observations 108,404 108,291 90,412 89,975
R-squared 0.022 0.023 0.028 0.031
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.10: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Populist party, OLS regression country dummy
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Indefinite contract -0.00348 0.000200
(0.00252) (0.00206)




Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.000532 -0.000137
(0.00512) (0.00426)















Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.11: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Populist party, comparison between urban and rural






















Indefinite contract 0.00559 0.00769**
(0.00417) (0.00323)




Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.0198** -0.00798
(0.00855) (0.00676)













Rightwing self-placement 0.0733*** 0.0867***
(0.00329) (0.00242)
Anti Poor Immigrant 0.0171*** 0.0187***
(0.00439) (0.00320)
Anti-immigr culture 0.0528*** 0.0465***
(0.00463) (0.00314)
Immigr is bad for economy 0.0244*** 0.0213***
(0.00403) (0.00284)
Anti-immigr same race -0.0110** -0.00998***
(0.00481) (0.00331)
Anti-immigr diff race 0.0268*** 0.0290***
(0.00507) (0.00358)
Immigr make cntry worse 0.0241*** 0.0355***
(0.00431) (0.00299)






Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.12: Closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural domicile, OLS
regression country dummy
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(1) (2) (3) (4)












Age 5.28e-05 -9.12e-05 -0.000529* 0.000192







(2.10e-06) (2.11e-06) (2.75e-06) (2.95e-06)
Education (years) -0.00603*** -0.00572*** -0.00510*** -0.00308***
(0.000176) (0.000179) (0.000207) (0.000221)
Sex(male) 0.0152*** 0.0151*** 0.0186*** 0.0178***
(0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00145) (0.00155)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.0117*** 0.0116*** 0.00845***
Suburbs (0.00245) (0.00266) (0.00275)
Domicile = 3, 0.0105*** 0.00896*** 0.00635***
Small city (0.00205) (0.00225) (0.00233)
Domicile = 4, 0.0206*** 0.0190*** 0.0130***
Country village (0.00207) (0.00228) (0.00238)
Domicile = 5, 0.0154*** 0.0129*** 0.00865***
Home in countryside (0.00291) (0.00317) (0.00331)
Market Labor




Indefinite contract -0.00297 0.000520
(0.00215) (0.00220)






Unemployed, actively -0.0140*** -0.0111**
looking for job (0.00456) (0.00476)
Unemployed, NOT -0.00785 -0.00765
actively looking for job (0.00606) (0.00632)
Retired -0.00774** -0.0101***
(0.00303) (0.00321)













Immigr is bad for economy 0.0172***
(0.00197)
Anti-immigr same race -0.00999***
(0.00233)
Anti-immigr diff race 0.0232***
(0.00252)




Constant 0.123*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.0117
(0.00658) (0.00679) (0.00868) (0.00934)
105
Observations 143,143 142,991 119,649 106,003
R-squared 0.318 0.319 0.263 0.266
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






















Indefinite contract -0.000819 0.00127
(0.00377) (0.00270)




Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.0157* -0.00877
(0.00819) (0.00582)












Rightwing self-placement 0.0612*** 0.0684***
(0.00304) (0.00211)
Anti Poor Immigrant 0.0114*** 0.0112***
(0.00395) (0.00271)
Anti-immigr culture 0.0363*** 0.0307***
(0.00415) (0.00264)
Immigr is bad for economy 0.0138*** 0.0188***
(0.00359) (0.00236)
Anti-immigr same race -0.0120*** -0.00916***
(0.00432) (0.00277)
Anti-immigr diff race 0.0270*** 0.0218***
(0.00456) (0.00302)
Immigr make cntry worse 0.0254*** 0.0258***
(0.00385) (0.00250)






Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.14: Vote for Far-right party in last election, comparison between urban and rural domi-














Age 0.00124*** 0.00113*** -0.000161
(0.000177) (0.000177) (0.000248)
Age2 4.39e-06** 5.41e-06*** 1.35e-05***
(1.79e-06) (1.79e-06) (2.55e-06)
Education (years) -0.00769*** -0.00740*** -0.00664***
(0.000169) (0.000172) (0.000201)
Sex(male) 0.00962*** 0.00940*** 0.0125***
(0.00125) (0.00125) (0.00140)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, -0.00483** -0.00264
Suburbs (0.00235) (0.00259)
Domicile = 3, 0.00556*** 0.00811***
Small city (0.00194) (0.00215)
Domicile = 4, 0.0131*** 0.0161***
Country village (0.00196) (0.00218)
Domicile = 5, 0.0218*** 0.0258***
Home in countryside (0.00284) (0.00312)
Market Labor












looking for job (0.00397)
Unemployed, NOT -0.00826
actively looking for job (0.00529)
Retired 0.00569*
(0.00300)
Unemployed (3 months+) -0.00899***
(0.00169)
Constant 0.0753*** 0.0660*** 0.119***
(0.00521) (0.00547) (0.00766)
Observations 222,584 222,274 175,837
R-squared 0.060 0.061 0.064
Country dummy YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






















Indefinite contract -0.00155 -0.00702***
(0.00340) (0.00258)




Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.0106 -0.00319
(0.00656) (0.00493)











Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.16: Index of closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural domicile,











Age -0.000102* -0.000106* -0.000254***
(5.85e-05) (5.87e-05) (8.24e-05)
Age2 3.45e-06*** 3.49e-06*** 4.69e-06***
(5.89e-07) (5.91e-07) (8.49e-07)
Education (years) -0.000606*** -0.000594*** -0.000518***
(5.61e-05) (5.70e-05) (6.73e-05)
Sex(male) 0.00288*** 0.00287*** 0.00325***
(0.000415) (0.000416) (0.000470)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, -0.00153** -0.00162*
Suburbs (0.000781) (0.000867)
Domicile = 3, -0.000459 -7.12e-05
Small city (0.000643) (0.000720)
Domicile = 4, 9.68e-05 0.000774
Country village (0.000649) (0.000729)
Domicile = 5, 0.00109 0.00200*
Home in countryside (0.000943) (0.00104)
Market Labor












looking for job (0.00133)
Unemployed, NOT -0.00105
actively looking for job (0.00176)
Retired 0.000464
(0.000999)
Unemployed (3 months+) -0.00217***
(0.000566)
Constant 0.00178 0.00188 0.0102***
(0.00173) (0.00182) (0.00256)
Observations 227,427 227,096 178,781
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013
Country dummy YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






















Indefinite contract 0.00113 -0.000820
(0.00113) (0.000868)




Unemployed, actively looking for job 0.00182 -0.000776
(0.00218) (0.00165)











Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.18: Strict Index of closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural






















Indefinite contract -0.000150 -0.00933**
(0.00471) (0.00376)




Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.00245 -0.00131
(0.00957) (0.00777)











Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.19: 2nd Index of closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and rural













Age -0.000327*** -0.000333*** -0.000628***
(0.000101) (0.000102) (0.000133)
Age2 5.15e-06*** 5.21e-06*** 7.95e-06***
(9.90e-07) (9.94e-07) (1.34e-06)
Education (years) -0.000996*** -0.000977*** -0.000832***
(8.87e-05) (9.03e-05) (0.000102)
Sex(male) 0.00264*** 0.00263*** 0.00339***
(0.000680) (0.000681) (0.000734)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, -0.00363*** -0.00330**
Suburbs (0.00125) (0.00132)
Domicile = 3, -0.00125 -0.000976
Small city (0.00105) (0.00112)
Domicile = 4, -0.000392 0.000240
Country village (0.00106) (0.00114)
Domicile = 5, 0.00106 0.00247
Home in countryside (0.00151) (0.00160)
Market Labor












looking for job (0.00225)
Unemployed, NOT -0.00246
actively looking for job (0.00306)
Retired -0.000861
(0.00154)
Unemployed (3 months+) -0.00223**
(0.000895)
Constant 0.0119*** 0.0127*** 0.0265***
(0.00303) (0.00315) (0.00421)
Observations 108,404 108,291 90,412
R-squared 0.018 0.018 0.018
Country dummy YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1






















Indefinite contract 0.000536 -0.000462
(0.00174) (0.00139)




Unemployed, actively looking for job 0.000106 -0.00367
(0.00353) (0.00286)











Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.21: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Far-right party, comparison between urban and





VARIABLES Idx closeness to eu-
roscept Party












Low income (perceived) 0.0462*** 0.0567***
(0.00649) (0.00484)








Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.00411 -0.00219
(0.0126) (0.00967)











Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.22: 2nd Index of closeness to Eusceptic party, comparison between urban and rural


















Low income (perceived) 0.00707 0.0237***
(0.00806) (0.00549)








Unemployed, actively looking for job 0.0133 0.00266
(0.0152) (0.0108)








EU gone too far 0.0899*** 0.103***
(0.00635) (0.00407)






Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

















Age 6.75e-06 -0.000197 0.000257 -0.000792*






(3.00e-06) (3.01e-06) (3.95e-06) (4.78e-06)
Education (years) -0.00533*** -0.00489*** -0.00356*** -0.00266***
(0.000251) (0.000255) (0.000298) (0.000347)
Sex(male) 0.0177*** 0.0174*** 0.0187*** 0.0152***
(0.00187) (0.00187) (0.00208) (0.00245)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00468 0.00475 0.00198
Suburbs (0.00349) (0.00382) (0.00447)
Domicile = 3, 0.0103*** 0.0101*** 0.00531
Small city (0.00292) (0.00323) (0.00376)
Domicile = 4, 0.0201*** 0.0211*** 0.0173***
Country village (0.00295) (0.00327) (0.00384)
Domicile = 5, 0.0335*** 0.0359*** 0.0264***
Home in countryside (0.00413) (0.00454) (0.00532)
Market Labor
Low income (perceived) 0.0230*** 0.0123***
(0.00319) (0.00383)









Unemployed, actively 0.0147** 0.0127*
looking for job (0.00653) (0.00769)
Unemployed, NOT 0.0292*** 0.0165
actively looking for job (0.00866) (0.0104)
Retired 0.00840* 0.0119**
(0.00435) (0.00525)
Unemployed (3 months+) 0.0178*** 0.0173***
(0.00252) (0.00294)
Cultural values
EU gone too far 0.0765***
(0.00287)
Mistrust in EU parliament 0.0697***
(0.00280)
Constant 0.111*** 0.0955*** 0.0574*** 0.0737***
(0.00938) (0.00967) (0.0125) (0.0147)
Observations 143,707 143,554 120,021 84,682
R-squared 0.194 0.194 0.168 0.184
Country dummy YES YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


















Low income (perceived) 0.00416 0.0150***
(0.00699) (0.00457)








Unemployed, actively looking for job 0.0298** 0.00545
(0.0139) (0.00922)








EU gone too far 0.0722*** 0.0790***
(0.00539) (0.00339)






Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.25: Vote for Eusceptic party in last election, comparison between urban and rural




VARIABLES Idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
Idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
Idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
Demographic
Age 0.00814*** 0.00794*** 0.00699***
(0.000238) (0.000239) (0.000333)
Age2 -6.71e-05*** -6.51e-05*** -5.72e-05***
(2.41e-06) (2.42e-06) (3.45e-06)
Education (years) -0.00970*** -0.00919*** -0.00677***
(0.000226) (0.000229) (0.000268)
Sex(male) 0.0214*** 0.0210*** 0.0284***
(0.00167) (0.00167) (0.00187)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00425 0.0103***
Suburbs (0.00313) (0.00345)
Domicile = 3, 0.0157*** 0.0178***
Small city (0.00258) (0.00287)
Domicile = 4, 0.0249*** 0.0291***
Country village (0.00261) (0.00291)
Domicile = 5, 0.0478*** 0.0533***
Home in countryside (0.00379) (0.00417)
Market Labor












looking for job (0.00530)
Unemployed, NOT -0.00196
actively looking for job (0.00707)
Retired -0.00342
(0.00403)
Unemployed (3 months+) 0.0180***
(0.00225)
Constant 0.139*** 0.119*** 0.131***
(0.00703) (0.00737) (0.0103)
Observations 216,047 215,770 171,744
R-squared 0.063 0.064 0.070
Country dummy YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




VARIABLES Idx closeness to eu-
roscept Party












Low income (perceived) 0.0565*** 0.0631***
(0.00470) (0.00332)








Unemployed, actively looking for job -0.00822 0.00259
(0.00913) (0.00648)











Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.27: Index of closeness to Eusceptic party, comparison between urban and rural domi-




VARIABLES idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
Demographic
Age 0.00697*** 0.00683*** 0.00634***
(0.000190) (0.000190) (0.000272)
Age2 -6.10e-05*** -5.97e-05*** -5.48e-05***
(1.91e-06) (1.92e-06) (2.81e-06)
Education (years) -0.00428*** -0.00397*** -0.00331***
(0.000182) (0.000185) (0.000222)
Sex(male) 0.0321*** 0.0318*** 0.0349***
(0.00135) (0.00135) (0.00155)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 0.00270 0.00782***
Suburbs (0.00254) (0.00287)
Domicile = 3, 0.0112*** 0.0135***
Small city (0.00209) (0.00238)
Domicile = 4, 0.0145*** 0.0198***
Country village (0.00211) (0.00241)
Domicile = 5, 0.0349*** 0.0401***
Home in countryside (0.00306) (0.00345)
Market Labor












looking for job (0.00438)
unemployed, NOT 0.00358
actively looking for job (0.00583)
Retired 0.000774
(0.00330)
Unemployed (3 months+) 0.0148***
(0.00187)
Constant 0.102*** 0.0893*** 0.0789***
(0.00562) (0.00590) (0.00846)
Observations 227,427 227,096 178,781
R-squared 0.065 0.066 0.070
Country dummy YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




VARIABLES idx closeness to eu-
scept Party












Low income (perceived) 0.0308*** 0.0357***
(0.00388) (0.00272)








Unemployed, actively looking for job 0.00816 0.00282
(0.00757) (0.00535)











Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.29: Strict Index of closeness to Eusceptic party, comparison between urban and rural




VARIABLES idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
idx closeness to eu-
scept Party
Demographic
Age 0.00588*** 0.00570*** 0.00547***
(0.000289) (0.000290) (0.000391)
Age2 -5.24e-05*** -5.07e-05*** -4.88e-05***
(2.83e-06) (2.83e-06) (3.93e-06)
Education (years) -0.00526*** -0.00490*** -0.00411***
(0.000253) (0.000258) (0.000298)
Sex(male) 0.0297*** 0.0294*** 0.0321***
(0.00194) (0.00194) (0.00216)
Domicile
Domicile = 2, 6.70e-05 0.00525
Suburbs (0.00356) (0.00388)
Domicile = 3, 0.0119*** 0.0148***
Small city (0.00299) (0.00328)
Domicile = 4, 0.0168*** 0.0223***
Country village (0.00303) (0.00335)
Domicile = 5, 0.0297*** 0.0364***
Home in countryside (0.00432) (0.00470)
Market Labor












looking for job (0.00659)
Unemployed, NOT 0.0196**
actively looking for job (0.00899)
Retired 0.00247
(0.00451)
Unemployed (3 months+) 0.0131***
(0.00263)
Constant 0.118*** 0.105*** 0.0903***
(0.00865) (0.00899) (0.0123)
Observations 108,404 108,291 90,412
R-squared 0.062 0.063 0.068
Country dummy YES YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES YES
Income classes dummy NO NO YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




VARIABLES idx closeness to eu-
scept Party












Low income (perceived) 0.0278*** 0.0348***
(0.00551) (0.00411)








Unemployed, actively looking for job 0.0104 0.00481
(0.0107) (0.00827)











Country dummy YES YES
Wave dummy YES YES
Income classes dummy YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.31: 2nd Strict Index of closeness to Eusceptic party, comparison between urban and
rural domicile, OLS regression country dummy
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